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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The philosophy of Henri Bergson is primarily of 
historical importance today. Curiously, the man who cap-
tivated academic and popular audiences in France at the 
turn of the century now, only forty years after the pub-
lication of his last major work, elicits the serious at-
tention of only a handful of scholars. However dramatic 
and forceful his impact might have been, it seems in re-
trospect indeed short-lived. 
Since Bergson so well understood that evolutionary 
progress demands the continuous overcoming of old forms 
and the creation of new, he would have been the last to 
lament the fact that much of his work has been supplanted 
by more advanced research and evidence. Quite more dis-
turbing, however, would have been the realization that his 
philosophy may have well been superseded before it was 
fully understood. The intent of this paper is to take up 
at least one of the issues which is relatively unexplored 
in the history of Bergsonian research and, by situating it 
within the framework of his broader philosophical concerns, 
to renew ap appreciation of Bergson's work and to under-
score his historical importance as an early formulator of 
contemporary questions. 
1 
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The problem of expression, which is the focus of 
the present study, arises within the context of Bergson's 
epistemological distinction between intellect and intuition. 
His theory of knowledge, in turn, is rooted in his meta-
physics of duration. This vital interdependency of ideas 
requires an elucidation of Bergson's duration theory before 
proceeding to questions of knowledge and expression. Chap-
ter I, therefore, reviews Bergson's metaphysics of duration 
in order to justify and explain its application to conscious-
ness and the external world. 
Within the context of an enduring world, there are 
two distinct ways in which the mind knows its objects. First 
of all, the intellect, which seeks a stable basis for action, 
employs static conceptual representations to immobilize the 
continuously moving and changing duree. Intuition, on the 
other hand, with no practical interest, dispenses with sym-
bols and seeks a pure, immediate grasp of duration as dura-
tion. This epistemological distinction between intellectual 
and intuitive modes of knowing is the topic of Chapter II. 
The question inevitably arises, however, as to what 
forms of expression, if any, can adequately accomodate our 
intuitive apprehensions. When Bergson proposes that intui-
tion dispense with symbols, does this fact imply that immed-
iate experience is wholly inexpressible and incapable of be-
ing communicated? Chapter III takes up this problem and 
-
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interprets Bergson's suggestion that the mind ''create supple, 
mobile, almost fluid representations, always ready to mold 
themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition." Bergson 
will further suggest that there are at least three forms of 
human expression, namely language, music, and art, which are 
capable of fluid representation and hence more accurate ex-
pression of the universal duree. 
A final consideration is Bergson's recorrnnendation 
that philosophy, particularly metaphysics, employ the intui-
tive method. If philosophy proceeds by intuition and adopts 
the fluid forms of expression appropriate to it, does it 
thereby forfeit its cherished precision and rigor? Chapter 
IV explores the implications of Bergson's view for philo-
sophical discourse and method. 
At the outset of this paper, it should be carefully 
noted that Bergson's philosophy of expression is a topic 
which demands the synthesizing of fragmentary texts and 
. 
some venturesome interpretation in order to clarify and com-
plete their meaning. Bergson's theory of expression, to 
some extent explicitly developed in his writings and to some 
extent contributed by an illustration and elaboration of his 
texts, is more susceptible to misinterpretation than it would 
be if it involved textual exposition alone. But the project 
also has a more positive side. However difficult the recon-
struction of Bergson's position might be, it is urged upon 
us by the fact that some of his most provocative and 
illuminating ideas are presented in embryonic form. His 
philosophy of expression, and in particular his notion of 
fluid representation, are foremost among those ideas. 
4 
CHAPTER I 
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BERGSON'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology are insepa-
rable. The justification of his metaphysics of duration 
depends largely on the validity of his theory of intuition; 
in turn, his basic distinction between intellectual and in-
tuitive knowing is an outgrowth of the metaphysical assump-
tion that reality is duration. This radical interdependency 
of metaphysical and epistemological concerns makes impera-
tive a discussion of the salient features of Bergson's dur-
ation prior to an analysis of his theory of knowledge. The 
problem of expression, rooted as it is in Bergson's epis-
temology, cannot. be defined or explicated until the broader 
framework of his metaphysics is before us. Clearly, the 
organic character of Bergson's thought demands such a de-
tour. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to offer a 
descriptive analysis of the metaphysical principle of dur-
ation, showing its earliest use in reference to conscious-
ness and its subsequent extension to include the external 
world. This examination of the duration theory, in addition 
to showing the defensibility of his metaphysics, will also 
enable us to formulate the problems of knowledge and 
5 
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expression to which it gives rise. 
DURATION 
Oddly enough, duration did not always enjoy the 
status of a metaphysical principle in Bergson's philosophy. 
Although the concept of duration was introduced in Bergson's 
earliest work Time and Free Will (1889), it was discussed 
principally as a feature of consciousness with no clear 
application to the external world. 1 The first indication 
that Bergson was working toward a theory of the duration of 
matter appeared in Chapter IV of Matter and Memorl (1896). 
Although duration received explicit formulation as a meta-
physical principle as early as 1902 in Introduction to 
MetaEhlsics, the problem of proving the duration of matter 
1Although Bergson does make reference to the ex-
ternal world in Time and Free Will, it is always with a 
2 
view to contrasting it with conscious duration. His 
consistent aim is to show that duration only describes 
consciousness, since it is innnaterial, unextended and non-
spatial, whereas it does not describe matter which is ex-
tended and spatial with all that implies. It is therefore 
curious that Mil·ic Capek maintains that as early as Berg-
son's Essai the problem of psychological time begins to 
merge with the problem of duration in general. Milic Capek, 
Bergson and Modern Phzsics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy 
of Science, Vol. VII Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1971), 
p. 89. 
2Prior to Chapter IV Bergson does make two brief 
allusions to the fact that matter, particularly the body, 
is in process of duration. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 
trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul an.d W. Scott Palmer (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co~, 1959), pp. 178, 192. This 
theory is not thoroughly nor systematically developed, how-
ever, until the final chapter. 
---
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continued to preoccupy Bergson throughout Duration and 
Simultaneity (1922) and The Creative Mind (1934). Since 
duration achieved its metaphysical stature only gradually as 
Bergson's thesis advanced, it is necessary to trace the two-
fold development of the duration of consciousness and the 
external world in order to arrive at its essential meaning. 
Prior to this discussion, however, let us review 
the main lines of the general theory of duration. Bergson 
consistently argues that there are two distinct ways in 
which the mind can conceive of time. On the one hand, time 
can be regarded as a "pure duration," a temporal flow en-
tirely free of space; on the other hand, it can be consid-
ered a homogeneous or "spatialized" time, a temporality 
defined according to spatial categories and made dangerously 
analogous to space itself. 3 This contrast invites analysis 
3Bergson's distinction between the two temporalities 
is most explicit in the following texts: Time and Free Will, 
trans. by F. L. Pogson, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1960), pp. 99-100, 137-39; Matter and Memory, pp. 
272-73; Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell, The 
Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1944), pp. 366-70; 
Duration and SimultaneitZ, trans. by Leon Jacobson, The 
Library of Liberal ArtsNew York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), 
pp. 49-51; The Creative Mind (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, 
Adams and Co., 1970), pp. 12-13, 124. A lucid presentation 
of these two views of time and a discussion of them in terms 
of modern physics is contained in an article by Satosi 
Watanabe, "The Concept of Time in Modern Physics and Berg-
son's Pure Duration" in Ber son and the Evolution of Ph sics, 
ed. by P. A. Gunter (Knoxvi e: T e University o Tennessee 
Press, 1969), pp. 62-76. Unquestionably the most substantial 
and extensive treatment of the topic is found in two books 
by Milic Capek: Bergson and Modern Physics and The Philo-
so hical Im act of Contem orar Ph sics (Princeton, N.J.: 
D. Van Nostran Co., 1 . 
of the concepts of space, homogeneous time and pure dura-
tion. We will proceed, first of all, by defining "space" 
which is the pivotal concept in Bergson's distinction of 
8 
the two temporalities; secondly, by characterizing that 
form of temporality which is an admixture of space and time 
and, as such, is an unfortunate and distortive representa-
tion of duration; and finally, by describing pure duration 
or "real time," which is Bergson's key metaphysical princi-
ple. 
Bergson defines space quite simply as "an empty 
homogeneous medium," homogeneity consisting in "the absence 
of every quality. ,.4 There are several consequences of this 
assumption. First of all, in space one distinguishes objects 
not on the basis of their qualitative differences-for space 
assumes the complete absence of quality-but on the basis of 
the positions of the objects relative to one another. In 
order to differentiate in this manner, the objects must be 
present simultaneously. 5 It is then the spatial intervals 
between the simultaneously existing objects that make possi-
ble discrimination among them, even if the objects in question 
4Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 95, 98, 120-21. 
5This concept of the simultaneous presence of ob-
jects in space is a subtle intrusion of time into the con-
sideration of space. Appreciating that simultaneity fuses 
space and time, Bergson says that "the connecting link be-
tween these two terms, space and duration, is simultaneity, 
which might be defined as the intersection of time and 
space." Time and Free Will, p. 110. 
9 
are qualitatively undifferentiated or identical in nature. 6 
A necessary condition for differentiating coexistent ob-
jects is the perception of them as circumscribed or spa-
tially delimited in themselves and separated by a spatial 
interval from other objects. These spatial intervals can 
be measured and infinitely divided; 7 the objects which they 
separate can, by virtue of their externality, be counted. 8 
Thus space introduces quantity into the world of objects 
and enables us to perceive them "all at once" as a multi-
plicity of discrete units in juxtaposition to one another. 9 
In summary, space is an empty, homogeneous medium in which 
simultaneously existing objects become separated, differen-
tiated, juxtaposed and enumerated. So described, space ac-
counts at least in part for the relations among objects in 
the material world. 
611 Space is what enables us to distinguish a number 
of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; 
it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that 
of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a 
reality with no quality . . . because we afterwards inter-
pret this difference of quality as a difference of situa-
tion, it follows that we must have a clear idea of a homo-
geneous medium, i.e., of a simultaneity of terms which, 
although identical in quality, are yet distinct from one 
another." (Time and Free Will, p. 95) 
7Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 246-53, 273, 290; 
Creative Evolution, pp. 335-36. 
8Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 78-79, 85, 87, 
99; Creative Evolution, pp. 280-81. 
9Time and Free Will, pp. 120-21, 162-63; Duration 
and Simultaneity, p. 60 . 
. ..,.... 
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Bergson severely criticizes the theory of time 
advanced by classical physicists and generally accepted by 
common sense, for surreptitiously introducing space into 
the temporal process. 10 Homogeneous time is nothing but 
the projection of time into space, with the result that we 
unwittingly fall back upon space and really give up time. 11 
Bergson argues that when the temporal process is regarded 
as a one-dimensional homogeneous medium, it must be "given 
all at once," which amounts to saying that we abstract it 
from duration. 12 It is "given all at once" in the sense 
that it is viewed as a totality, a completed process in 
which the past and future coexist with the present, and in 
which discrete events appear in the order of their succes-
sion. In isolating these successive states, we have in 
10c1assical physics developed from the Newtonian 
mechanics. It persisted through the nineteenth century 
generally evolving toward a corpuscular-kinetic scheme in 
which the universe was regarded as "an enormous aggregate 
of bits of homogeneous material whose quantity remained 
constant while the spatial distribution was continuously 
changing according to the immutable laws of mechanics." 
(Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, 
p. 6) The emergence of the theory of relativity and 
quantum mechanics in the early part of this century neces-
sitated radical changes in the concept of space, time, 
motion, and matter and formed the foundation of modern 
physics. The philosophical import of this contrast between 
classical and modern physics is the topic of Capek's book. 
11Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 98. Cf. pp. 99, 
101; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 52-53. 
12Time and Free Will, p. 98. 
11 
effect demarcated moments in time, separated them by tern-
poral intervals, and externalized them in relation to one 
another. Thus we have created a series of static units 
which can be counted and quantified like objects in space. 13 
Furthermore, placing these units in succession introduces 
order, and ordering requires that we first distinguish and 
compare the terms ordered. 
Hence we must perceive them as multiple, simultaneous 
and distinct; in a word we set them side by side, and 
if we introduce an order in what is successive, the 
reason is that succession is converted into simulta-
neity and is projected into space.14 
In making an order of succession, we are led to the 
linear model and its implicit spatiality. When time is re-
presented as a line extended in space, its duration is marked 
by a series of individual instants strung along the continu-
um.15 This linear representation renders homogeneous time 
16 as infinitely divisible as space. In order to conceive 
time as a continuum, we must have before us, all at once, 
13Time and Free Will, pp. 104-05, 123-24; Intro-
duction to-MetaphySics:-t"rans. by T. E. Hulme, The Library 
of Liberal Arts (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955), pp. 
43-44; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 49 51; Creative 
Mind, p. 12. 
14Time and Free Will, p. 102. 
15Ibid., pp. 103, 181-82, 237; Creative Evolution, 
pp. 335-39; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 50-51, 53, 66; 
Creative Mind, p. 12. 
16 See n. 8. 
... 
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the past, present and future. When they are mapped out 
as discrete points along a line, they become simultaneous. 
Duration is eclipsed, for past, present and future do not 
unfold but are already given. The uninterrupted and con-
tinuous process of time is reduced to a string of simulta-
neities, and its passage is marked by advancing from one 
static point to the next. Therefore, the major consequence 
of viewing time as a homogeneous medium is that it acquires 
all the characteristics that homogeneity implies, and be-
comes scarcely distinguishable from space itself. Homo-
geneous time, as the movement through a linear succession 
of discrete, static instants, has forfeited its essential 
temporality and has more resemblance to space than to any 
enduring process. 
In order to correct this misconception of time, 
Bergson introduces the notion of "real time" or pure dura-
tion, a temporality entirely free of space and all that its 
homogeneity entails. Its essential features are described 
in the following passage in 1:vhich Bergson draws an analogy 
between pure duration and a musical tune. 17 Although strict-
ly speaking music is a succession oi notes, 
Might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed 
one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and 
that their totality may be comparecr-to a living being 
whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another . 
17The full implications of Bergson's frequent use 
of music as an analogue will be discussed in Chapter III . 
13 
We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, 
and think of it as a mutual tenetration, an intercon-
nexion and organization of e ements, each one of which 
represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or 
isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is 
the account of duration which would be given by a be-
ing ... who had no idea of space.18 
The contrast with homogeneous time is clear. The unity of 
duration is organic; it resides in the continuity of the 
process itself and not in the proximity in space or juxta-
position along a continuum of discrete elements. The endur-
ing process gradually unfolds and thereby "hinders every-
thing from being given 'all at once. 11119 Just as in a melody, 
there is no clear definition of the point where one note 
ends and another begins, so in duration one moment flows 
into the next, resulting in a "mutual penetration" of ele-
" . . h d. . . 1120 s. d t. ments, a succession wit out istinction. ince ura ion 
is a thoroughly continuous and indivisible process, there 
are no isolable "states," no discrete "befores and afters," 
. 1 . 21 no simu taneous instants. Rather the past-flows-into-the-
18 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 100-01. Italics 
mine. 
19Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 93. 
20Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 107, 110, 237; 
Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 26-~7. 
21Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 272; Creative 
Mind, pp. 142-50, 15). 
14 
present-becoming-future with no halts and no clear demarca-
. f . 1 22 tion o interva s. 
One effect of this radical continuity is that time 
is essentially cumulative. 23 Each "moment" or event carries 
with it what preceded and anticipates whatever follows. 
With this prolongation of each "moment" into the next, the 
past survives in the present and moves with it into the 
future. Since duration is cumulative, each successive 
moment, preceded by a more amplified past, is an "uninter-
rupted upsurge of novelty. 1124 The "succession" of moments 
is unrepeatable, and the entire process is irreversible. 25 
22Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26; 
Mind-Ener~~· trans. by H. W. Carr (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co.,20), p. 39; Creative Mind, pp. 16, 93, 296-97. 
Bergson's use of the term "duration" to designate the 
continuous movement of time contrasts sharply with another 
conventional usage in which "duration" refers to what is 
lasting or permanent, and therefore atemporal. J. J. C. 
Smart, in a recent article on "Time" (The Encyclo¥edia of 
Philosophy, 1st ed., VIII, 126-34), is critical o the 
meaning Bergson intends because it is "heavily infected 
with the myth of passage~" 
23Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 209; Intro-
duction to Meta~hysics, pp. 26, 40; Creative Evolution, 
pp. 7-10, 20, 5 -53, 393; Mind-Energy, pp. 62-72; Duration 
and Simultaneity, pp. 48-49; Creative Mind, p. 153. 
24Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 18. 
25Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 8-9, 52, 91-93, 
105, 237-38, 369-70; Creative Mind, pp. 18-19, 91-106. 
For an extended discussion of the compatibility of con-
tinuity and novelty in Bergson's duree, see the article 
by Guy LaFrance, "Continuite et absolue nouveate dans la 
duree bergsonienne," Dialogue, VII (1968-69), pp. 94-101. 
15 
If each moment is non-identical with every other, then 
duration is a process of continuous change and is fundamen-
tally heterogeneous. 26 In order to ensure the continuity 
of duration in the midst of this incessant novelty and 
change, it is necessary to perceive that change is quali-
tative rather than quantitative in nature. Since quanti-
tative differentiation involves isolating and enumerating 
discrete instants, it clearly violates this principle of 
temporal continuity. A differentiation on the basis of 
quality, however, involves the perceiving of variations 
which occur as "states" continuously blend and interpene-
trate, without the necessity of separating or counting 
. 1 . d .. d 1 . 27 strict y in ivi ua units. The flow of duration is, then, 
an uninterrupted process of qualitative change. As Bergson 
summarily states, "duration properly so called has no 
moments which are identical or external to one another, 
being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no 
26Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 104-05, 120, 235. 
In his objection to Bergson's identification of duration 
with the interpenetration of qualitative moments, Andrew 
Reck argues that the notion of interpenetration demands a 
"real distinctness" of qualities. He seems unaware of the 
subtle difference between things being distinguishable and 
things being separate. See Andrew Reck, "Bergson"s Theory 
of Duration," Tulane Studies in Philosophy, VIII (1959), 
pp. 30-31. 
27 Ibid. 
analogy to number. 1128 
Duration of Consciousness 
Bergson most frequently discusses the theory of 
duration, not as a general formula abstracted from things 
h . h d b . f "f• l" . 29 w 1c en ure, ut in terms o spec1 1c rea 1t1es. His 
initial and most persistent focus is the duration of con-
sciousness, which serves as the prototype for everything 
that endures. 30 In what manner and on what grounds does 
Bergson ascribe this pure duration to consciousness? 
Bergson answers the first of these questions much more 
readily than the second. 
16 
The essential feature of duration is its continuity, 
and what accounts for continuity on the level of conscious 
28Time and Free Will, p. 120. Cf. Time and Free 
Will, p. 104; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26. 
2911Pure duration" does not therefore refer to an 
abstract, wholly theoretical concept but rather to a 
temporality which is free from spatial intrusions and 
consequently "pure 0" See ~~~~_!'._!:.-:_and Memory, pp. 280-81. 
30Bergson uses the terms "consciousness" (la 
conscience) and "mind" (l'esprit) synonymously. Conscious-
ness includes whatever activities or functions come within 
the province of the mental life. The only exception to 
this occurs in Creative Evolution, where Bergson makes 
consciousness coextensive with life. This unusual usage 
of the term is restricted to that work and peculiarly 
suited to its purposes. When Bergson employs "conscious-
ness" in its narrower, more common meaning, he uses the 
term "conscious duration," "psychic duration," and "inner 
duration" as virtually equivalent. See Time and Free Will, 
pp. 75-139. They will also be used interchangeably in 
this paper. 
17 
life is memory. "There is no consciousness without memory," 
Bergson maintains, 
and no continuation of a state without the addition to 
the present feeling, of the memory of past moments. 
It is this which constitutes duration. Inner duration 
is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the 
past into the present, the present either containing 
within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing 
image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its 
continual change of quality the heavier and still 
heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. With-
out this survival of the past into the present1 there would be no duration, but only instantaneity.3 
Memory accounts for both the continuity of the temporal 
flow as well as for the change and novelty which constitute 
its heterogeneity. Memory ensures continuity by its pro-
longation of the past into the present, by its "continuation 
of what no longers exists into what does exist. 1132 Stimu-
lated by the present moment, memory recalls the past and, 
in doing so, induces an interpenetration of the past and 
present. While Bergson frequently refers to conscious 
states as an "enduring multiplicity," it is clearly a "mul-
tiplicity without divisibility. 1133 Memory achieves the 
mingling of past and present, the qualities of the former 
31Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40. Cf. 
Matter and Memory, pp. 80-81, 120, 131-32, 148, 188, 294-
97, 315-18; Creative Evolution, pp. 7-10, 20, 232; Mind-
Ener~y, pp. 7-8, 68; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 44, 
48-4 ; Creative Mind, pp. 153-55. 
32Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, p. 49. 
33 Ibid., p. 44. Cf. Time and Free Will, p. 101. 
shading and blending with the latter. Time, then, is 
thoroughly continuous for "the preservation of the past 
in the present is nothing else than the indivisibility of 
change. 1134 
18 
If "duration is the continuous progress of the past 
which gnaws into the future and swells it as it advances," 
then "consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. 113 5 
Duration is cumulative with the effect that its "multipli-
city of states" are heterogeneous, and the entire process 
which is continually amplifying, is also continuously chang-
ing. Consciousness 
cannot remain identical with itself for two consecutive 
moments, because the second moment always contains, over 
and above the first, the memory that the first has be-
queathed to it. A consciousness which could experience 
two identical moments is a consciousness without 
memory.36 
Each state in the progress of conscious life is new, and 
consequently the enduring process itself is irreversible. 37 
At the same time, "duration is continuous since no state 
begins or ends, but all ~xtend into each other. 1138 
Bergson's justification for the fact that conscious-
ness endures in this manner is never systematically set 
34Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 155 
35Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 7, 8. 
36Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 26 
37Bergson, Creative Evoluti<_?E~· pp. 8, 20. 
38Bergson, Introduction to Metaphy~ics, p. 25. 
out. There are at least three arguments, however, which 
occur repeatedly in his work and merit attention. First 
and most naively, Bergson insists that consciousness has 
an immediate apprehension of its own duration as it is 
simply "felt" and "lived. 1139 Until this immediate appre-
hension is brought to the level of reflection and more 
firmly substantiated, it can be readily disputed by the 
19 
rival claim of those who argue that they do not "feel" or 
"live" the duration of their own consciousness. 40 Second, 
Bergson's previously stated assumption that "there is no 
consciousness without memory" becomes significant when 
coupled with the additional claim~amply illustrated above~ 
that memory both accomplishes and expresses the indivisible 
continuity of the enduring process. If consciousness is 
essentially memory, and memory ensures duration, then any 
existent consciousness must endure. 
39Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 194, 196-97; 
Matter and Memor~, pp. 191, 272; Introduction to Meta-
physics, pp. 49- O; Creative Evolution, p. 53; Mind-
Energi, p. 179; Duration and Simultaneity, pp. 49, 62; 
Creative Mind, p. 13. See Creative Mind p. 32 for a 
succinct statement of how this immediacy will be accom-
plished on the reflective level through intuition. 
40This objection is raised by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 
Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 64, 65. 
Unfortunately, Elliot sees only this one aspect of Bergson's 
theory of immediacy and therefore discredits it as having 
no epistemological significance. 
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The third argument, however, is clearly the most 
decisive. Not only is it the most explicit and consistent 
that Bergson advances in support of his thesis, but it re-
veals how radically dependent his metaphysics is upon his 
theory of knowledge. In brief, the argument is this. The 
very nature and existence of duration is proved mainly by 
the fact that it is capable of being perceived. 41 If one 
perceives one's own conscious life by means of the intellect, 
then one imposes the categories of space and sees only a 
homogeneous time and not a pure duration. If one perceives 
consciousness by means of intuition, then one apprehends it 
immediately, without the interposing of spatial concepts, 
and sees it as the pure temporality or pure duration that 
it is. While this theory clearly demands a thorough inves-
tigation~a task which is reserved for the following chap-
ter~let it suffice to say here that Bergson's theory of 
duration is grounded subjectively in the ability of con-
sciousness to employ intuition in its own self-apprehension. 
Before taking up this crucial issue, we must conclude our 
exposition of the duration theory. 
Duration of the External World 
If duration ts going to attain the status of a 
metaphysical principle as Bergson clearly intends, it must 
41 Bergson, Time and Free Wil~, pp. 193, 223-24; 
Matter and Memory, pp. 280-293. 
p 
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be constitutive not only of consciousness but of the bodies 
and other material objects which comprise the external 
world. But when Bergson sets out to establish the enduring 
character of the external world, a task which he under-
standably postpones, he is faced with a rather impressive 
difficulty. As noted above, Bergson describes the duration 
of consciousness as a pure ternporality, free of space and 
extension and free of all homogeneity. What does Bergson 
do, however, when he comes to external objects which are, 
by virtue of their rnaterialiti, extended and situated in 
space? Clearly, the tenability of his metaphysics of 
duration will depend upon his ability to account for the 
duration of material objects. 
Bergson's changing position on the question of the 
duration of matter indicates how very troublesome and corn-
plex an issue he found it to be. In his first work, Time 
and Free Will, Bergson argues on behalf of the duration of 
consciousness but largely ignores the problem of the dura-
tion of matter. His assumption is simply that, since 
matter occupies space, material objects exhibit a "mutual 
externality without succession," and not the "succession 
without mutual externality" which characterizes the duration 
of consciousness. 42 In Matter and Memory, however, Bergson 
begins to modify this absolute dichotomy between the spatial 
42Time and Free Will, p. 227. Cf. pp. 99, 108. 
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and non-spatial, between matter and mind, and affirms the 
fundamental temporality of the physical world. 43 Although 
Creative Evolution basically supports the thesis that 
matter endures, there are also numerous passages which are 
regressive in characterizing matter as inertia, which in-
terrupts and divides the otherwise continuous flux of the 
real. 44 The final resolution of these difficulties in 
Creative Evolution, together with the arguments in Duration 
and Simultaneity (1922) and the two essays "Introduction I 
and II" (1922), confirms that in Bergson's mature thought 
matter is as integral to the universal d~ree as conscious-
ness itself. Let us now analyze his specific arguments. 
Bergson establishes the duration of matter on two 
separate grounds. Bergson's first argument, based upon the 
nature of matter itself, contends that matter is actually 
the continuous and indivisible movement of dynamic "centers 
of force" and not an inert substance which is readily divis-
ible into discrete and separate units. Bergson's second 
argument is based on his theory of consciousness. Bergson 
claims that the duration of matter is modeled on conscious 
43capek, Bergson and Modern Physics, p. 91. "In 
Matter and Memory, however, this untenable dualism of the 
temporal mind and timeless matter was given up, since 
becoming was reinstated into the physical realm." Cf. p. 
189. 
44Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 169, 220, 240, 
280-84, 294. 
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/ duree, and that there are specific experiences of conscious-
ness which will attest to that fact. A more thorough ex-
amination of these two arguments will show that, whether 
Bergson's point of departure is matter or consciousness, 
his case finally comes to rest on a theory of conscious 
perception. Once again, it is clear that Bergson's meta-
physics of duration depends for its validity on his theory 
of knowledge. 
Bergson's concept of matter, which is by common 
consent one of the most ill-defined and vague aspects of 
his metaphysics, affirms the continuous mobility and essen-
tial temporality of the physical world. In Matter and 
Memory, where Bergson comes closest to advancing a coherent 
position, matter is defined as "an aggregate of images, 1145 
the basic function of an image being to receive and give 
back movement. 46 The material universe is therefore com-
posed of numerous "centers of force" which are continuously 
moving and being moved by one another. 47 This uninterrupted 
process of reciprocal action testifies to the fundamental 
duration, continuity and indivisibility of matter. 
In order for interactions to occur, matter must be 
deployed in time. The "fundamental law of matter," Bergson 
45 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 5, 8, 26, 43. 
46
rbid., pp. 4-5. 
47 rbid., p. 26. 
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explains, is "to reply to an action received by an immediate 
reaction which adopts the rhythm of the first and continues 
it in the same duration, to be in the present and in a pre-
sent which is always beginning again. ,AB The interactions 
among its "centers of force" enable matter to be sustained 
in the present and prolonged into the future. Movement 
requires time, and the reciprocal motion which constitutes 
matter accounts for its temporal endurance. The dynamical 
organization of matter at once presumes and ensures its 
duration. 49 
Although perilously close to the atomism he criti-
cizes, Bergson's theory differs from classical atomism in-
sofar as it does not isolate its constitutive elements. As 
Bergson states in Matter and Mem~£Y_, 
We may still speak of atoms; the atom may even retain 
its individuality for our mind which isolates it; but 
the solidity and inertia of the atom dissolve either 
into moverrents or into line::; of force whose reciprocal 
solidarity bri ··gs back to us universal continuity. 50 
Although Bergson speaks of matter in terms of atomistic 
elements, he hastens to add that their incessant interaction 
48M~tt.2r a!!~Merl!~~EX· p. 279. 
49There is every indication that duration, whether 
of consciousness or of matter, has basically the same 
feat1:1'res. (Cf. Capek, ~rg.son ?_"?;d Modern.Physics, p. 191~ 
In discussing the duration ofiliatter, however, Bergson fails 
to touch upon all of the characteristics applied to conscious 
duration. This is yet another indication of his obscuring 
the theory of matter. 
50 Bergson, Matter and Mem9ry, p. 265. 
-·-----... 
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achieves a "reciprocal solidarity," making matter itself 
continuous and indivisible. Bergson offers the example of 
the solar system. "Our sun radiates heat and light beyond 
the farthest planet and . our entire solar system is 
moving in a definite direction as if it were drawn. 1151 
There is, Bergson insists, a "bond between the worlds. 1152 
The thread attaching the sun to the rest of the universe 
is doubtless very tenuous. Nevertheless it is along 
this thread that is transmitted down to the smallest 
particle of the world in which we live the duration 
immanent in the whole of the universe.53 
Moreover, 
if there is a truth that science has placed beyond 
dispute, it is that of the reciprocal action of all 
parts of matter upon each other. Between the sup-
posed molecules of bodies the forces of attraction 
and repulsion are at work. The influence of gravi-
tation extends throughout interplanetary space.54 
Even in the outer reaches of space where bodies seem most 
separate and indifferent, there is a bond of active forces 
between them. Matter exhibits a continuity of interactions, 
an interpenetration of its "centers of force," which cannot 
properly speaking be divided. Any interpretation of matter 
as absolutely divisible, as composec of strictly delimited 
51Bergson, Creative Ev::>lut~on, p. 263. 
52Ibid. 
53 rbid., p. 14. 
54Bergson, ~atter and Memory, p. 264. 
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bodies isolated in themselves and external to one another, 
could only be a consequence of a mind which immobilizes the 
activity it perceives and divides what is continuous. Any 
interpretation of matter as inert, discontinuous or divis-
ible is an effect of conscious perception and not a descrip-
tion of matter itself. 
The main force of Bergson's argument, whether it 
takes matter or consciousness as its starting point, hinges 
on the theory that conscious perception both hinders and 
facilitates our view of matter as an uninterrupted mobility 
and duration. First of all, we are hindered by the twofold 
tendency of the mind to immobilize and divide what it per-
ceives. The mind's tendency to render its objects immobile 
is due in part to the nature of the intellect itself, which 
seeks what is inert and unchanging in whatever it perceives, 
with the result that it can comprehend movement only in 
terms of static points through which the moving object 
passes, and can understand duration only in terms of the 
progress from one static instant to the next. 55 On the 
other hand, we tend to immobilize external objects because 
their rhythm of duration may differ from ours, becoming 
either so rapid or so slow as to seem motionless. 56 Our 
55Matter and Memory, pp. 275-76, 278, 305; Creative 
Evolution, pp. 327-28; Creative Mind, pp. 14-15, 70. 
56There are several passages where Bergson speaks 
of the different rhythms of duration (Matter and Memory,. 
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perception of matter as inert and unchanging is due to our 
habitual tendency to view objects relative to our own tern-
poral rhythm. 
Once matter is immobilized, it then becomes readily 
divisible into independent objects. Although Bergson ac-
knowledges that we do legitimately discriminate among mater-
ial objects, he consistently denies that they are in reality 
absolutely separate. 
That there are, in a sense, multiple objects, that one 
man is distinct from another man, tree from tree, stone 
from stone, is an indisputable fact: for each of these 
beings, each of these things has characteristic proper-
ties and obeys a determined law of evolution. But the 
se aration between a thin and its environment cann~ 
e a so ute y e 1n1te an c ear cut; t ere is a pas-
sage by insensible gradations from the one to the other: 
the close solidarity which binds all the objects of the 
material universe, the perpetuity of their reciprocal 
actions and reactions, is sufficient to prove that they 
have not the precise limits which we attribute to 
them.57 
Bergson's explanation of our tendency to divide the indivis-
ible is, once again, that "the primary and most important 
pp. 75, 275-76, 279; Introc!_uc~ion_!9_Metap}~sics, p. 47; 
Duration and Simultaneity, p. SI). Consequently, if some-
thing moves at a speedrar exceeding our cwn, the speed of 
light for example, we perceive its effect:; as colors which 
are stable. Similarly, if something changes so slowly as 
to be imperceptible, the gradual wearing and aging of a 
rock for example, then it seems changeless. For further 
illustrations, see H. Wildon Carr, !ienri Bergson: The 
Philoso~hy of _Change (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1919), 
pp. 38- 9. 
57Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 277-78. Italics 
mine. 
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operation of the perceiving mind" is that "it marks out 
divisions in the continuity of the extended, simply follow-
ing the suggestions of our requirement and the needs of 
practical life. 1158 In order to so divide matter, the mind 
projects beneath the continuous mobility of the real an 
infinitely divisible substratum of homogeneous space. 59 We 
then are able to employ the linear model and mark out points 
in space which represent independent objects. 60 What 
prompts our division of the world in this manner is the 
urgency of our own biological needs and the requirements 
of action. 61 Unless objects are clearly set off from one 
another, such practical, life-sustaining activities as 
procuring food, seeking out what is useful and avoiding 
what is harmful, become immensely difficult, if not impos-
sible. Needs are directed toward and satisfied by specific 
types of objects and our ability to fulfill our needs 
necessitates the delimiting and defining of those objects 
within the environment. 62 
As necessary as this capacity for immobilizing and 
58Matter and Memory, p. 278. 
59rbid., pp. 278, 280, 292. 
60rbid., p. 279. 
61
rbid., pp. 261-62, 266, 280-82, 290; Creative 
Evolution, pp. 173, 297. 
62Matter and Memory, pp. 261-62. 
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dividing reality may be, Bergson laments that we confuse 
our reinterpretation of matter for practical purposes with 
the nature of matter itself. 63 Quite surprisingly, however, 
Bergson recognizes that the mind's tendency to perceive 
different rhythms of duration, which contributes to the im-
mobilization of matter, also enables consciousness to grasp 
matter's essential mobility and duration. Furthermore, 
Bergson goes beyond the naive assumption that consciousness 
simply "feels" the duration of external objects, and suggests 
that the mind, through intuition, can know an object "from 
within" as the dynamical organization it is. These are the 
two basic arguments Bergson provides to establish the dura-
tion of matter from the viewpoint of consciousness. 
The ability of consciousness to perceive different 
rhythms of duration has important implications for the 
duration of matter. Bergson's argument originates in the 
observation that "the states of our material world are con-
temporaneous with the history of our consciousness. As the 
latter endures the former must be bound in some way to real 
duration. 1164 Bergson's classic example of "waiting for the 
sugar to melt" illustrates this point. 
. 
63Matter and Memor~, p. 262. "It is nothing, in 
fact, but the ordinary con ition of useful action, un-
suitably transported into the domain of pure knowledge." 
64B ·c . M" d 20 ergson, reative in , p. . 
--
If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, 
willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little 
fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have 
to wait ... coincides with my impatience, that is 
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to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which 
I cannot protract or contract as I like.65 
The fact that consciousness waits on an event in the ex-
ternal world, indicates that things are accomplished, not 
"all at once," but gradually in time. Consciousness comes 
to this realization when it is kept waiting, when the un-
folding of things in time moves more slowly than the dura-
tion of consciousness. By contrast with our own psychic 
time, the temporality of the physical world announces itself 
by progressing at a rhythm different from our own, but 
neither too rapid nor too slow to be an imperceptible dif-
ference. Thus, the selfsame ability of consciousness to 
view the duration of material objects relative to its own 
leads to a view of matter as inert and atemporal, and to 
a view of matter as mobile and enduring. 
A second proof for the duration of matter which 
derives from consciousness is discussed in the famous ex-
ample from Introduction to Metaphysics of an object moving 
in space. 66 Bergson claims that the movement of an object 
can be viewed in two ways: either "relatively," from a 
65 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 12-13: Cf. 
Creative Mind, pp. 20-21, 33. ·--
66Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22. 
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perspective external to the object, or "absolutely" from 
"inside" the moving object itself. In the first instance, 
the movement is calculated in terms of a series of points, 
axes or other symbols of measurement. In the second case, 
such symbols are dispensable since the object is viewed 
"from where it is, from within, as it is itself. 1167 The 
former is the method of intellectual analysis, the latter 
is the work of intuition. 
The significance of this passage for the duration 
of material objects is this. Whether Bergson is discussing 
the spatial or temporal movement of an object, he attributes 
to the object an "inside" and an "outside." This unfor-
tunately dualistic language serves more to obscure than to 
clarify the point Bergson intends to make. Bergson is not 
speaking of two different kinds of objective reality, or 
two different natures of a single object. What is decisive 
in this text is that what seems to be a metaphysical claim 
is actually a statement about the ideal limits of perception. 
"Inside" refers not to some mysterious region of being which 
is different in nature from an outer strata, but to the 
extent of the mind's penetration of the object and its 
ability to see it as the temporally fluid and continuous 
reality that it is. Bergson avoids a metaphysical dualism, 
as he consistently argues that the object or the so-called 
67
rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 22. 
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"absolute" is a "simple thing. 1168 It is possible, however, 
to view this simple reality in-depth or superficially, from 
the unmediated point of view of intuition or through the 
mediating symbols which the intellect constructs and con-
fuses with the reality itself. He is speaking, then, not 
of two realities, but of reality as viewed from two per-
spectives. 
These two forms of knowledge, their limits and 
possibilities, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 
II. The point to be made here is that Bergson can without 
contradiction affirm the duration of exte~ded material ob-
jects by appealing to the distinction, which is basically 
an epistemological one, between the object as an absolutely 
simple, enduring reality, and the object perceived as an 
inert, discrete unit of matter. If the mind, by means of 
intuition, is capable of discerning material objects as 
uninterrupted processes of movement in time, then the dura-
tion of matter is confirmed by the intuitive apprehension 
of consciousness. 
W:Lth the preceding argllments on behalf of the Jllra-
tion of matter, we have come full circle. Bergson has in-
tended to show that "duration . is the foundation of 
our being, and ... the very substance of the world in 
68Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 23. 
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which we live. 1169 In establishing his metaphysics of 
duration, he has offered evidence for the duration of con-
sciousness and the external world, for the continuous tern-
porality and mobility of mind and matter. However con-
vincing these claims, our acceptance of his metaphysics 
must be tentative to the extent that it is based on epis-
temological considerations. The validity of the arguments 
grounded in conscious perception will depend upon our find-
ings in the critical examination of Bergson's theory of 
knowledge. 
Epistemological Implications of 
Bergson's Metaphysics 
The interdependency of Bergson's metaphysics and 
theory of knowledge, remarked upon early in the discussion, 
has now taken on a more specific sense. It is clear from 
the preceding analysis that the burden of proof for the 
duration of consciousness and the external world falls to 
Bergson's epistemology. If the enduring character of reality 
is confirmed by consciousness perceiving it as such, then 
Bergson must explain the conditions for the possibility of 
such knowledge. Since this epistemology will be elaborated 
r 
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peculiar set of problems. How can a reality in process of 
continuous movement and change be known? How does con-
sciousness which is itself temporal grasp external objects 
which have different rhythms of duration? In short, to 
what extent does knowledge require stability in the knower, 
in the known and in the relation between them? 
Bergson's theory of intuition is an attempt to 
justify and explain, on the cognitive level, how conscious-
ness can have an immediate knowledge of duration as dura-
tion. Whether or not duration can be known in its con-
tinuous temporal flow rests on the theory of intuition; 
and since the knowability of duration is the major proof 
Bergson offers for the fact that "reality endures," his 
metaphysics finally depends on the strength of his epis-
temology. That epistemology, in turn, must face the prob-
lems of a temporal consciousness striving for knowledge 
within an enduring world. 
In the following chapter, I will examine the basic 
structure of Bergson's theory of knowledge~the distinction 
between intellect and intuition. In doing so, my interest 
will be both retrospective and prospective. On the one 
hand, the discussion will bear in mind the critical role the 
theory of knowledge, particularly intuition, plays in sub-
stantiating his metaphysics of duration. On the other hand, 
it shall anticipate the problem of expression which will 
emerge from the theory of intuitive knowledge. If Bergson 
is able to show that we can in fact cognitively apprehend 
duration, then the problem arises as to what forms of ex-
pression, if any, will be adequate to this knowledge of a 
fluid and mobile duree. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECT AND INTUITION 
Any theory of knowledge makes certain presupposi-
tions about the world, for in a very fundamental way our 
methods of knowing structure the kind of world we see. 
Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition, 
which is the basis of his epistemology, rests upon this 
assumption. The method of intellectual analysis, employing 
abstract and immobile symbolic representations, apprehends 
static images rather than process, homogeneous time rather 
than pure duration. Intuition, on the other hand, dispenses 
with symbols and gives us a direct, immediate grasp of 
duration as duration. Consequently, Bergson critizes the 
methods of the intellect for obscuring duration, while he 
recommends to our use intuition which discloses it. The 
nature and function of these two mental operations will be 
analyzed in this chapter in the interest of substantiating 
Bergson's metaphysics, and in the interest of taking up the 
new questions to which the distinction gives rise. 
At the outset it should be noted that intellect 
and intuition are not diametrically opposed as is commonly 
36 
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assumed. A careful reading of Bergson will indicate that 
they are not separate faculties, but distinct, though com-
plementary functions of the mind. Of the two, intellect is 
unquestionably the more general. In a somewhat confusing 
manner, Bergson uses the word "intellect" equivocally: in 
its broadest usage, it is synonymous with mind and encom-
passes all mental activity; in its more specific sense, 
it is a specialized function of the mind which is set in 
contrast to intuition. While Bergson trades more heavily 
on the second meaning, there are also several texts in which 
intelligence is virtually equivalent to the mind itself. 
Frequently, intuition is described as a function of the in-
2 tellect; Bergson even defines intuition as an "intellectual 
1Bergson, Mind-Energ~, pp. 34-35. Among the few 
commentators to stress thisact are G. W. Cunningham, A 
Study in the Philosophy of Berfson (New York: Longmans~ 
Green and Co., 1916) and Pete . Gunter, "Bergson's Reflec-
tive Anti-Intellectualism," Personalist, XLVII (1966), 43-
60. Of particular importance is Chapter III of Cunningham's 
study, "Intuition and Intelligence" (pp. 32-64), in which 
he defends the following thesis: "intuition involves 
intellectual activity and transcends it, if at all, only as 
a more comprehensive and concrete form of the same sort of 
knowledge. From this point of view, 'there is no essential 
difference between the intellect and this intuition it-
self.'" (p. 61) For a typical overstatement of the opposi-
tion between intelligence and intuition see Harold N. Lee, 
"Bergson's Two Ways of Knowing," Tulane Studies in Philos-
~. VIII (1959), p. 49. Lee's entire article is founded 
on this misconception. 
2Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 78-79. There are even 
a few vague suggestions in Bergson's essay on "intellectual 
effort" (Mind-Energy, pp. 210, 214) that the intellect 
accomplishes work normally attributed to intuition. Cf. 
Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 51. 
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ausculation113 or an "intellectual sympathy. 114 Bergson 
also acknowledges the existence of intuition "around the 
fringes of the intellect," further implying that it is an 
auxiliary function of the more general capacity of intelli-
gence. 5 Bergson maintains that intuition completes the 
work of the intellect by disclosing the mobile aspect of 
reality which it is incapable of grasping. 6 Mindful, then, 
that Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition 
does not suggest their absolute separation, let us analyze 
their diverse but related funtions. 
The Problems of Intellectual Analysis 
The intellect, considered as a specific operation 
of the mind, knows an object by means of analysis. In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson describes the work of 
analysis as the accumulation of multiple perspectives on an 
object, the translation of them into conceptual represen-
tations, and the subsequent reconstruction of the object by 
a synthesis of the points of view on~ has symbolized. 7 In 
3Bergson, Mind-Energy, pp. 36-37. 
4Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 23-24, 
51, 61. 
5Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. xxiii, 53, 56, 
211; Creative Mind, p. 80; The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion, trans. by F. L. Pogson (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1960), p. 212. 
6
creative Evolution, p. 195, 372-73. 
7Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 24. 
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examining our use of this method, Bergson finds that, 
despite its practical value, it effects certain subtle dis-
tortions of the reality we are seeking to know. At every 
stage of the analytical process, the intellect exhibits two 
main tendencies: it retains only general aspects of any 
concrete reality, and it takes only static views of its 
enduring objects. This generalization and immobilization 
of reality Bergson traces to the conceptual representations 
or symbols which are integral to the analytical method. 8 
The perceptions from which the concept is derived, and the 
linguistic, musical and artistic forms in which it is 
expressed, are adapted to the concept and share its basic 
tendencies. Consequently, Bergson's critique of intellec-
tual analysis encompasses not only its cognitive processes 
of perception and conception, but the expressive forms in 
which these concepts are embodied. 
The first stage of analysis, which is perception, 
begins with the intellect taking a point of view on its 
8
when Bergson employs the term "symbol," he intends 
only its basically representative function. Although he 
does make occasional mention of numerical symbolism (Time 
and Free Will, pp. 78-79, 86-90, 119, 234; Matter and--
Memory, p. 255; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 52; 
Creative Evolution, pp. 230-31, 237; Creative Mind, pp. 
12-13), his preoccupation is unquestionably with language. 
In fact, as we shall subsequently see, his identification 
of the concept with the word is so consistent and so strong 
that his critique of concepts becomes, in effect, a critique 
of language as well. 
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object, 9 and then varying and multiplying successive points 
f . t · 1 . f . . . b . d lO o view un i a series o impressions is o taine . There 
are two aspects of this procedure which are especially 
significant. First of all, when consciousness observes an 
object from a particular perspective, it must necessarily 
adopt a position external to the object from which its 
observation can be made. Bergson argues that taking an 
"outside" point of view precludes access to the object "from 
where it is, from within, as it is in itself. 1111 To accum-
ulate perspectives around an object, Bergson maintains, is 
not to "enter into it." A second implication is that 
points of view provide only glimpses or snapshots of the 
reality perceived. 12 As Bergson will more amply illustrate 
in his discussion of the concept, the collection of these 
separate perspectives can never give more than a partial 
and static view of the object. Thus, even in the initial 
9unless specifically indicated otherwise, this and 
all subsequent uses of the word "object" denote its most 
general meaning as anything which can be taken as an object 
of knowledge, not just material or external objects. 
10 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 24, 
38. 
11rb;d., 21 22 f L PP• - • Cf. 38-39. 
12rbid., pp. 24, 25. See also Matter and Memory, 
p. 278. "Such is the primary and most apparent operation 
of the perceiving mind: it marks our divisions in the con-
tinuity of the extended, simply following the suggestions 
of our requirement and the needs of practical life." 
------- - - ---- -- -
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act of perception, consciousness is situated outside its 
object, viewing it from a series of fixed positions exter-
nal to it. 
In the second stage of analysis, the impressions 
obtained in perception are translated by the intellect into 
concepts. 13 Bergson broadly defines concepts as "abstract, 
general, or simple ideas1114 which are, in effect, "symbols 
substituted for the object they symbolize. 1115 In serving 
their representative functions, concepts "never actually 
give us more than an artificial reconstruction of the 
object, of which they can only symbolize certain general 
13Although Bergson repeatedly alludes to the in-
tellect as the concept-making faculty, he states so quite 
explicitly in Creative Evolution, pp. xix,56. 
Jean Theau, in his recent book La critique bergson-
ienne du concept (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1968), argues this thesis: "D'un bout a l'autre de son 
(Bergson'aj ouevre, nous esperons le montrer, c'est sa cri-
tique de la pensee par concepts, laquelle engendrait une 
nouvelle critique de l'intelligence." (p. 15) However prom-
ising Theau's topic, there are disappointing features of 
its realization. First of all, Theau gives only casual 
treatment to Bergson's Creative Mind and Introduction to 
Metaphysics in deference to an exceedingly lengthy and 
technical analysis of Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, 
Creative Evolution and Two Sources (p. 20). This selective-
ness causes many of Bergsori'~s most lucid and summary state-
ments on the concept to be overshadowed by the bulk of his 
psychological and biological data, which lends them only 
vague support. In addition, Theau's emphasis also results 
in a relatively sparse treatment of Bergson's innovative 
notion of the "fluid concept." Secondly, Theau's study has 
its stylistic difficulties. It frequently suffers from 
verbosity, grandiloquence and a devotional tone. 
14Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 27. 
15Ibid., p. 28. 
and, in a way, impersonal aspects. 1116 Bergson explains 
that a concept grasps only the general features of an 
object since it 
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retains only that part of the object which is conrrnon 
to it and to others, and expresses ... a comparison 
between the object and others which resemble it .... 
The concept can only symbolize a particular property 
by making it common to an infinity of things. It 
therefore always more or less deforms the property by 
the extension it gives to it .... Thus, the differ-
ent concepts that we form of the properties of the 
thing inscribe around it so many circles, each much 
too large and none of them fitting it exactly.17 
The generality of the concept to which Bergson refers is 
familiar. Since concepts are, at least in principle, 
applicable to more than one object, they must be suffi-
ciently general to include all the particulars which share 
in their meaning. Understandably, the broader the extension 
of the concept, the more general and diluted its meaning 
becomes. 18 What is perhaps less commonly observed is that 
this generality does a disservice to the object it repre-
sents. For example, when the word "red" is applied to a 
particular item, it implies that its color is comparable 
to the red of other things. Although this particular shade 
of red may be quite distinctive, the conce~t does not de-
liver its uniqueness. When we attempt to solve the problem 
16
rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 29. 
17rbid., pp. 28-29. Cf. 22, 37. 
18Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 49. 
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by inventing intermediary concepts, such as scarlet, bur-
gundy or vermilion to express these subtle variations, we 
simply prolong the difficulty. Each of these concepts in 
turn encompasses different shades of scarlet or burgundy. 
So even if we specify gradations indefinitely, we can never 
eradicate the essential generality of the concept. 19 Thus, 
although Bergson will admit that the concept exhibits re-
markable versatility by being employable in a variety of 
contexts and in reference to numerous objects, 20 he also 
sees that its extension has the serious disadvantage that 
the concept is always "too large," too imprecise, too ab-
stract to disclose the novel or distinctive features of a 
concrete, particular object. 21 
Another even more serious limitation of the concept 
is its tendency to immobilize and divide its objects. Con-
cepts, like the perceptions from which they are derived, are 
only so many snapshots of reality which, however diligently 
they are accumulated, remain only motionless and partial 
views of the object they symbolize. 22 In conceptualizing 
19 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 28, 39. 
20Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 174-77. See 
Theau, La critique bergsonienne du concept, pp. 445-46. 
21 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 28; 
Creative Mind, pp. 34-35, 95; Creative Evolution, p. 180. 
22Bergson explains the static nature of concepts by 
the fact that the intellect is modeled on inert matter, 
rather than on living, dynamic realities. (Creative Evolu-
tion, pp. 177, 216-17, 225, 273, 281; Creative Mind, pp. 
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our own conscious life, for example, the intellect marks 
out "states" and "sensation," designates them by separate 
concepts, and then attempts to recreate the continuity of 
conscious life by combining the different concepts. 23 
Similarly, we distinguish objects in the continuous flow 
of matter by demarcating their boundaries with separate con-
cepts. 24 We further divide these individual objects by 
b k . th d . l" . d "b t 25 rea ing em own into numerous qua ities an attri u es. 
Thus, whether the intellect employs concepts to divide 
reality itself into consciousness and matter, 26 or con-
sciousness into states, or matter into things, or things 
into attributes, the effect is always to decompose what is 
whole and continuous into parts which are discrete and 
stable. 
38-39, 42-43) Just as the material world "presents to us 
objects external to other objects, and, within these ob-
jects, parts external to parts," (Creative Evolution, p. 
169), so concepts "are outside each other, like objects in 
space; and they have the same stability as such objects on 
which they have been modeled." (Creative Evolution, p. 177). 
23Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 162-64, 167, 196; 
Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 40; Mind-Energy, p. 179; 
Creative Evolution, pp. 5-7, 281, 297; Creative Mind, 
p. 95. 
24Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 170-71, 245, 293; 
Creative Evolution, pp. 297, 328; Creative Mind, pp. 34-35. 
25Bergson, Introduction to Metaphrsics, pp. 30, 44; 
Creative Evolution, pp. 228, 326-27. Itollows that the 
more subdivisions the intellect makes, the more complexity 
it finds in the object. 
26 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 190-91. 
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The third stage of analysis is the intellect's 
effort to recompose the fullness and fluidity of the object 
by gathering together the concepts into which it has been 
divided and solidified. 27 Bergson argues that once an 
object is dissected conceptually, it cannot be grasped as 
unified and entire simply by combining the various concepts 
which describe it. Even if concepts are multiplied, their 
inherent generality prevents them, either individually or 
collectively, from seizing the particular. 28 Amassing gen-
eralities does not account for the move beyond the general 
toward the concrete, individual object. Furthermore, the 
accumulation of static and partial conceptions in an effort 
to seize the enduring object is equally unsuccessful. The 
problem of collecting a set of inert concepts is analogous 
to stringing together motionless points in order to con-
ceive movement. As discussed in Chapter I, however numerous 
the points on a line and however minute the intervals be-
tween them, a series of immobilities will never disclose 
27
rn Creative Evolution Bergson indicates the 
intellect's "unlimited power of decomposing according to 
any law and of recomposing into any system." (p. 173) 
28Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 22. 
Bergson also suggests here that only when these general 
concepts are grasped intuitively can they lead to a knowl-
edge of the particular object. It should be carefully 
noted that this is not a function of the concepts them-
selves, but of the intuitive process which is auxiliary to 
them. 
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the uninterrupted progress of the moving object. 29 Move-
ment slips through the intervals, 30 for at most one has 
traced the path along which the object has passed, but not 
the actual passing itself. 31 Similarly, any attempt to 
reconstruct reality out of so many conceptual viewpoints is 
bound to be inadequate. In Creative Evolution, Bergson 
compares the intellect to a cinematograph. 32 Just as the 
I 
unreeling of a film tries to simulate continuous action by 
a rapid succession of discrete, motionless frames, so does 
the intellect attempt to capture enduring objects by syn-
thesizing stable conceptions of them. What results is a 
string of conceptual snapshots which give, at best, merely 
29I d · . M h . 42 ntro uction to etap ysics, p. . 
I, pp. 11-12. 
Cf. Chapter 
30Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 334. 
31This was precisely the error of Zeno. If one 
expresses movement as a series of points along a line, and 
notes the progress of the moving object by marking its pas-
sage from point to point, there is nothing to prevent one 
from inserting an infinite number of points along the course 
through which the moving object must pass. Hence, with an 
infinite number of points to be surpassed, the arrow will 
never reach its target and Achilles will never pass the 
tortoise. (Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 111-115; Intro-
duction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22, 43-45; Creative Evolu-
tion, pp. 335 f.; Creative Mind, pp. 17, 144-45.) For an 
extensive analysis of Bergson and the Eleatic paradox see 
the essay by Harve Barreau, "Bergson et Zenon d'El~e: La 
conception bergsonienne du mouvement et l'eleatisme," Revue 
Philosophi3ue de Louvain, LXVII (May, August, 1969), 267-
84, 389-43 . 
32Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 331-35, 339, 341, 
354; Creative Mind, pp. 18, 93. 
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the illusion of real duration. Bergson's conclusion is 
that concepts are, by their very nature, general and static 
representations through which the particularity and conti-
nuity of reality always escapes. 
If intellectual analysis does such a disservice to 
the world in the process of perceiving and conceptualizing 
it, what is it that recommends this method to our use? 
Bergson's answer is simple. While intellectual analysis 
proves incapable of a pure, disinterested grasp of reality 
as it is, it serves the very practical function of stabil-
izing and ordering the world to prepare it for action. The 
intellect adopts the analytical method in response to our 
need to survive in a world of change, for analysis, step by 
step, creates a stable conceptual framework in which to 
harness the fluid world. In Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Bergson summarizes this work of the intellect: 
the normal work of the intellect is far from being 
disinterested. We do not aim generally at knowledge 
for the sake of knowledge, but in order to take sides, 
to draw profit~in short, to satisfy an interest. We 
inquire up to what point the object we seek to know 
is this or that, to what known class it belongs, and 
what"k'Ind orB:Ction, bearing or attitude it should 
suggest to us .... To try to fit a concept to an 
object is simply to ask what we can do with the ob-
ject, and what it can do for us. To label an object 
with a certain concept is to mark in precise terms 
the kind of action or attitude the object should sug-
gest to us. All knowledge properly so called, is then 
oriented in a certain direction or taken from a cer-
tain point of view.33 
33Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 38-39. 
Cf. Time and Free Will, pp. 129, 133-34, 138-39, 230-31, 
.........__ - - ------ - - - - --------
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Clearly the aim of the intellect is pragmatic~it seeks to 
know the world in order to determine the use to which it 
might be put or the action we should adopt toward it. The 
point of view we take in perception betrays the particular 
interest we have in the object. Our subsequent conceptual-
izing of the object according to that point of view enables 
us to identify, classify and order the random particulars 
of experience, and to arrest their continuous mobility in 
fixed, well defined concepts. These efforts of the intel-
lect serve to orient us in the world and to give us a firm 
basis for action. 
So deeply ingrained is the need to falsify the 
enduring world for our practical ends, that the tendencies 
inherent in the cognitive process carry over to our modes 
of expression as well. Each of the three major expressive 
forms, language, music and the visual arts, exhibit certain 
characteristics which ally them to the process of intellec-
tual analysis and open them to the same criticisms. 
Language, which is the principal medium for the 
expression of conceptual thought, inherits virtually all 
the limitations of the concept due to the fact that, for 
236-37; Matter and Memory, pp. 21, 33, 191, 241, 278, 304-
0~; Introduction to Meta¥hy~ics, pp. 45, 50; Creative Eyolu-
tion, pp. 173, 210, 214 ., 217, 296-97, 324, 332-33; Mind-
Energy, pp. 58, 71; Creative Mind, pp. 70, 78, 80; Two 
Sources, pp. 253-54. Cf. Theau, La critique bergsonienne du 
concept, p. 316. 
I 
~ 
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Bergson, the word is the concept expressed. 34 Like concepts, 
words also suffer from being too general insofar as the 
meaning they express is capable of encompassing several 
particulars; 35 they are static, not only because of their 
obvious rigidity in form, but also because of their relative 
stability in meaning. 36 Furthermore, the word performs the 
same ordering and abstracting function as its conceptual 
counterpart, enabling us to manipulate the world of objects 
and to create the network of social relations which is es-
sential to most life-sustaining and productive activity. 37 
Language, at least on the surface of things, seems to share 
all the characteristics of the concepts it articulates. 
Chapter III, however, will include a more penetrating dis-
cussion of language, not in terms of its appropriateness to 
the analytical method, but in view of its adaptability to 
34see Chapter II, n. 8. While Bergson clearly 
identifies the concept with the word, he never explicitly 
addresses the question of whether thought is essentially 
linguistic or whether it is possible to think in the 
absence of language. 
35Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 13, 132, 134-35, 
160, 163-64; Mind-Ener~y, pp. 153, 156; Creative Evolution, 
pp. 175-76; Creative Mind, pp. 55-56. 
36Time and Free Will, pp. ix, 129-32, 167, 196, 
226-27, 239-40; Matter and Memor~, pp. 59, 154, 158-59, 
239-40; Creative Evolution, pp.40, 354-55; Creative 
Mind, pp. 14, 27, 35, 56, 69, 81. See Theau, La critique 
oergsonienne du concept, pp. 445-46. 
37Time and Free Will, pp. 138-39, 231; Creative 
Evolution, p. 289; Creative Mind, pp. 70, 80; Two Sources, 
pp. 253-54, 275. 
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an intuitive grasp of duration as duration. 
Of lesser concern to Bergson are the expressive 
forms of music and art. While their detailed examination 
will be undertaken in the next chapter, a preliminary obser-
vation to be made here is that both modes of expression 
bear the stamp of the intellect by being essentially static 
in form. A musical score, for example, symbolizes the con-
tinuous temporal flow of musical sound by means of a succes-
sion of discrete notes on a line in space. 38 The limitations 
of this symbolic form are analogous to those Bergson finds 
in other linear models used to represent time or motion. 39 
Whether a series of points is used to represent moments in 
time, the positions of a moving object or notes in a musical 
tune, the problem is that the extended line of inert points 
is a spatial symbolism and, as such, is inadequate to con-
vey a temporal process. A musical score is a prime example 
of this attempt to express time· spatially, and to reduce 
its continuous movement to a succession of motionless points. 
The visual arts of painting and sculpturing present 
a similar problem. As Bergson remarks in Time and Free Will, 
''The plastic arts obtain an effect of the same kind by the 
38Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 147-48. Bergson's 
entire discussion of music turns on the distinction between 
music as a written score and music as it is heard when per-
formed. In the context of his theory of intellectual analy-
sis, the first of these is most important. 
39see Chapter I, pp. 11-12. 
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fixity which they suddenly impose upon life, and which a 
physical contagion carries over to the attention of the 
spectator. ,AO Painting and sculpturing, which are intrin-
sically spatial, are composed of a juxtaposition of inert 
visual forms. The problem by now is familiar: Bergson 
suggests thatmotionless forms placed side by side in space 
cannot adequately symbolize the uninterrupted duration of 
things. Furthermore, Bergson questions the ability of the 
visual arts to represent an enduring object completely. In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson cites the example of 
an artist painting the Tower of Notre Dame in Paris. How-
ever numerous the sketches, however varied the point of 
view, the artist can never reconstruct the actual tower. 41 
As Bergson argues elsewhere, numerous partial glimpses will 
never, taken together, give the actual object in its entir-
ety. The plastic arts, then, employ static imagery which 
arrests the fluid temporality of things and which offers 
only a still glimpse or snapshot of its object, providing 
only one of many perspectives which could be taken of it. 
What this brief discussion shows very clearly is 
40 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 15. Italics mine. 
One is reminded of John Keats' node on a Graecian Urn" 
wherein the vase, depicting a moment's activity as frozen 
and eternally changeless, becomes the prototype of the 
visual arts. 
41Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 32. 
Cf. p. 22. 
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the definite effect which the analytical method has, not 
only upon language, but upon the expressive forms of music 
and art. If intellectual analysis consists in the tendency 
to innnobilize and divide the continuous flow of duration 
into discrete perceptions and concepts, then it is equally 
important to recognize that our most connnon forms of ex-
pression are infected with the same tendencies. Upon ex-
amining the intu~tive method, which is capable of grasping 
duration as duration, these three expressive forms will be 
reviewed again in terms of the possibilities they hold for 
overcoming the limitations imposed by intellectual analysis. 
Intuition: An Alternative to the Intellect 
Bergson's study of the problems of the intellect, 
particularly its inability to conceive duration, leads not 
only to a critique of the analytical method, but to the 
constructive suggestion that the mind adopt an alternative 
mode of knowing, intuition. The methodological differences 
between the intellect and intuition arise from their funda-
mental difference in purpose: whereas the intellect is 
governed by practical interests and approaches objects with 
a view towards their utilization, intuition seeks only a 
pure, disinterested knowledge of reality as it is; while 
the aim of the intellect is to seek in reality a support 
for action, intuition seeks to comprehend reality in its 
53 
. d' 42 concrete imme iacy. 
In order to accomplish its objective, intuition 
must avoid the pitfalls of intellectual analysis. Since the 
intellect's tendency to assume a point of view in perception 
and employ conceptual representations in the thought process 
serves to generalize and immobilize the concrete duration of 
existing things, intuition must either dispense with the 
tools and operations of the intellect or substantially re-
vise them in order to grasp duration as duration. Thus, as 
Bergson develops the theory of intuition, he contrasts it 
point by point with the method of intellectual analysis. 43 
42introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 38-39; Creative 
Evolution, pp. 324-25, 372-73; Creative Mind, pp. 34, 127, 
138; Two Sources, pp. 249-50. It is instructive here to 
note that intuition has its roots in instinct. Although 
"instinct is not within the domain of intelligence," it 
is capable of an immediate "knowledge" of definite objects 
without the tendency to solidify them or view them as inert 
bits of matter. (Creative Evolution, p. 163 f.) Unlike in-
telligence, "instinct is molded on the very form of life." 
(Creative Evolution, p. 182) Intuition is instinct elevated 
to the level of rexlection. (Creative Evolution, p. 194; 
Creative Mind, p. 88) Although intuition abandons the prac-
tical interests of instinct, it retains its ability to grasp 
objects in their particularity and vitality. (Creativt 
Evolution, p. 194; Two Sources, pp. 249-50) For a more 
extended discussion of instinct, see J. M'Keller Stewart, 
A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1911); 17 -82. 
43see Andre Robinet, Bergson et les metamorphoses 
de la dur€e (Paris: Seghers, 19 5), pp. 144-48. There are 
at least two problems which result from the fact that 
Bergson contrasts the intuitive method with that of the 
intellect. First, Bergson's theory of intuition is fre-
quently criticized as anti-intellectual. This is clearly 
not the case since, as noted early in this chapter, intuition 
is actually a function of the intellect. In an article 
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Intuition begins in perception with the abandonment 
of the perspective or point of view adopted in analysis. 
Instead of assuming a position outside the object, Bergson 
proposes that the mind "enter into the object. 1144 to per-
ceive it "from where it is, from within, as it is in it-
self .1145 This penetration of the object is accomplished by 
a kind of "intellectual ausculation" or "intellectual 
sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in 
order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently 
inexpressible. ,,46 Relinquishing its practical interests, 
entitled "Bergson's Reflective Anti-Intellectualism," The· 
Personalist, XLVII (1966), 43-60, Pete Gunter argues that, 
although Bergson is critical of the intellect, he is not, 
in any extreme sense, anti-intellectual. Intuition, after 
all, is a type of reflection which is able to grasp reality 
more firmly and more completely than the intellect can. 
(See Chapter II, n. 49.) Second, Bergson is frequently 
criticized for defining intuition only negatively. As our 
subsequent discussion will show, intuition includes a theory 
of perception, conception and expression which are not 
simply negations of the intellectual method. but which 
have a positive content of their own. 
44Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 23, 
24, 51; Creative Evolution, pp. 194-95. 
45Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21-22. Although 
Theau's discussion of intuition lacks focus, it contains 
several lucid descriptions of this and subsequent stages of 
the intuitive process (La critique bergsonienne du concept, 
pp. 135-47). 
46Ibid., pp. 23-24. Cf. pp. 36-37, 51, 61. H. Wal-
don Carr argues that intuition is non-intellectual on the 
grounds that it is neither a perception nor conception. As 
our discussion will show, this interpretation is wholly un-
tenable since Bergson does make positive recommendations 
for the intuitive method at both stages. (Henri Bergson, 
The Philoso}hy of Change, Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat 
Press, 1970 , p. 22. 
the mind becomes attentive and sympathetic to what the 
object is in itself. 47 Instead of multiplying perspec-
tives, dividing and isolating its different positions or 
55 
moments or properties, the mind perceives the simple, indi-
visible reality of the particular object which underlies · 
all of these descriptions. 48 Since the mind possesses its 
object completely, there is nothing to be gained by sub-
jecting it to analysis. "Coincidence" with the object 
clearly obviates the need to measure and calculate its 
spatio-temporal movements from the outside. Rather, con-
sciousness adapts its own rhythm to that of the object and 
enters into its temporal flow. 49 Thus the concreteness and 
endurance of the object are already established in percep-
tion. 
47Merleau-Ponty rightly suggests that for Bergson 
"sympathy" does not mean that consciousness "becomes the 
organism" but rather that it "takes the thing by knowledge." 
Jean DePrun, ed., L'union de l'ame et du corps chez Male-
branche, Brian et Berfson. Notes prises au cours de M. 
Merleau-Ponty a l'~co e normale superieure (1947-48). 
(Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968), p. 114. 
48Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 28-29, 
40-41, 51, 60; Creative Mind, pp. 30-31. Bergson denotes 
the essence of the object by the unfortunate term "absolute" 
by which he means the object itself, the original. Although 
Bergson recognizes that the absolute can be analysed and 
divided indefinitely, he argues that "viewed from the inside, 
it is a simple thing." (Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 23) 
49At the same time that Bergson collapses the dis-
tance between consciousness and its object in perception, 
he claims with equal insistence that intuition is a type of 
reflection. (Creative Mind, p. 88) Is there not a contra-
diction here? On the one hand, reflection seems to demand 
56 
In order to avoid a regression to abstractness and 
immobility on the level of conception, Bergson boldly sug-
gests that the mind dispense with conceptual representations 
employed by the intellect in analysis. 50 Although Bergson 
occasionally hints that concepts can serve to prepare the 
mind for seizing its intuitions, 51 he argues much more 
extensively and forcibly that concepts serve more to prevent 
than to facilitate intuitive apprehensions. 52 In arguments 
set out in the previous section, the concept draws criti-
cism for its twofold tendency to an abstractness which ob-
scures the particularity of the concrete object, and to an 
immobility which stabilizes its interrupted flow. Although 
there are several texts which explicitly state that thought 
that consciousness objectify what it seeks to know, that is, 
that it create a distance between itself and its object. On 
the other hand, Bergson suggests that intuition is a kind of 
reflection which relies upon the "coincidence" between 
knower and known. (Creative Mind, p. 32) Seemingly unaware 
of the implications of reflection, Bergson fails to confront 
the problem and, as a consequence, also fails to resolve it. 
In situating Bergson within the context of phenomenology, 
VanPeursen introduces the issue but lends it only brief 
discussion. C. A. VanPeursen, "Henri Bergson, phenomeno-
logie de la perception," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 
LXV (1960), p. 323. 
SOBergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 21, 22, 
24. 56. 
51Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 164; Creative 
Evolution, pp. 42-43; Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 61; 
Creative Mind, pp. 42, 120. 
52 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 30, 37. 
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could occur in the absence of conceptual symbols 53 ~a dra-
matic statement which is never justified or explained~there 
are other, more sober texts which reconnnend that the con-
cepts of intellectual analysis be replaced by "new concepts," 
which are "supple, mobile, almost fluid representations al-
ways ready to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of in-
tuition. 1154 
Regretably, this notion of the "fluid concept," 
which is the mainstay of the intuitive method, is never ex-
plicitly illustrated nor defined. Its interpretation is 
unquestionably crucial to the theory of intuition, since the 
concept is integral to the processes of thought and expres-
sion. Our approach in deciphering this most obscure sugges-
tion will be, first of all, to examine Bergson's occasional 
references to "fluid concepts" in an effort to delineate 
their essential features, and then in the following chapter 
to analyze our conventional expressive forms to determine 
the extent to which the new concept can be articulated in 
language, music and art. Thus, once the basic character-
istics of the fluid concept are defined, it then will be 
possible to specify what forms of expression, if any, are 
appropriate to them. 
pp. 37, 
29, 31, 
53see Chapter II, n. 50. 
54 d . M h . Bergson, Intro uction to eta8 ysics, 
51; Creative Evolution, p. 55; reative 
44-45; Two Sources, p. 254. 
p. 30. Cf. 
Mind, pp. 
r 
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The guidelines which Bergson establishes for the 
"fluid concept" are, quite predictably, designed to over-
come the problems of the ordinary concept employed in anal-
ysis. Consequently, the new concept must "be cut to the 
exact measure of the object, 1155 it must be "a concept which 
is appropriate to that object alone, a concept which can 
yet hardly be called a concept, since it applies to this 
one thing. 1156 In other words, the concept must be tailored 
to the individual object, and must sacrifice the generality 
which ordinarily makes it applicable to a number of similar 
things. 57 Furthermore, the new concept must be fluid, that 
is, "capable of following reality in all its sinuousities 
and of adopting the very movement of the inward life of 
things. 1158 Clearly, if the new concept is to facilitate 
our intuitive grasp of the enduring world, it must abandon 
both the generality and the rigidity which, in analysis, are 
so essential to it. 
Although Bergson very plainly sets out these charac-
teristics of the new concept, he never explains how the or-
dinary concept should be altered to fit them. The only thing 
55Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 29. 
56Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 37. 
57
cf. Chapter II, pp. 41-43. By contrast, the 
concept employed in analysis sacrifices the particular for 
the sake of the general. 
58Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 51. 
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about which Bergson is definite is that the "fluid concept" 
is necessary to intuition. Underlying his faith in the 
fluid concept, and the intuitive method which it serves, is 
his tacit assumption that the mind can "reverse the direc-
tion of the operation by which it habitually thinks" and is 
able "perpetually to revise, or rather to recast,all its 
categories. 1159 Not only must the mind change its funda-
mental orientation to the world by forsaking its practical 
interests in favor of a pure, disinterested knowledge of the 
real, but it must revise its usual mode of perception by 
giving up its external point of view for coincidence with 
the object, it must replace the static concepts by which it 
ordinarily thinks with new, fluid concepts, and finally it 
must devise forms of expression which are appropriate to 
the demands of the new concept. Although Bergson frequently 
remarks upon the difficulty of this procedure, 60 he argues 
that the structure of the mind is not invariable, and what-
ever the mind can do it can also undo. 61 Despite the habit-
ual tendencies of the mind to conform to the analytical 
59Bergson consistently speaks of intuition, not as 
an automatic "flash" understanding, but as a process of 
thought requiring effort. (Introduction to Metaphysics, 
pp. 47, 60; Creative Mind, p. 35) 
60Bergson, Introduction to Metaph~sics, p. 51. Cf. 
pp. 38, 45, 52; Matter and Memory, pp. 24 -41; Creative 
Evolution, pp. 35, 178, 339, 341; Creative Mind, pp. 61, 
70, 142. 
61 Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 28-29, 70-73, 128. 
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method, Bergson maintains that this does not preclude the 
possibility of one's thinking intuitively and obtaining a 
direct, immediate grasp of the concrete duration of things. 
Bergson's epistemological theory of intuition is 
indefensible philosophically unless the notion of "fluid 
concept" can be concretely illustrated and shown to be 
viable. Hanging in the balance is not only the justifica-
tion of the intuitive method, but the validity of the meta-
physical claims which depend upon it. Bergson's arguments 
on behalf of the duration of consciousness and the external 
world presuppose the mind's ability to work intuitively, 
that is, to rid itself of those cognitive elements which 
divest duration of its concreteness and its continuous move-
ment. In turn, the mind's ability to apprehend duration as 
duration shows that it is able to transcend the spatial cate-
gories of the intellect and employ the simple, direct method 
of intuition. The implicit circularity of Bergson's posi-
tion can only be broken by determining the tenability of the 
intuitive method~an argument which depends upon giving some 
specific sense to the theory of the "fluid concept." 
CHAPTER III 
FLUID FORMS OF EXPRESSION: 
LANGUAGE, MUSIC AND ART 
The preceding analysis of Bergson's metaphysics and 
epistemology enables us now to formulate the problem of ex-
pression in more precise terms. As Bergson establishes a 
metaphysics of duration, he begins to question how an essen-
tially temporal world, which is continuously moving and 
changing, can be known. His epistemological distinction 
between intellectual analysis and intuition provides alter-
native responses to this question. On the one hand, the 
method of intellectual analysis fails to grasp duration as 
duration because of its predominantly practical interest, 
which requires that it abstract and stabilize the random 
particulars of experience to gain a foothold for action. 
Intuition, on the other hand, with no practical interest, 
seeks neither to abstract what is concrete nor to arrest 
what is fluid; it thereby achieves an immediate grasp of 
duree which is beyond the reach of analysis. Although 
Bergson's theory of intuition assures us that knowledge of 
the enduring world is possible, the question remains as to 
how these intuitive apprehensions are conceived and ex-
pressed. 
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Critics of Bergson often find that the method of 
intuition is simple-so simple in fact that it cannot be 
called a method at all. Intuition, they claim, is nothing 
more than "a flash understanding," an instantaneous, pre-
reflective insight which it is impossible to symbolize or 
express. 1 This reading of Bergson is grossly incomplete. 
As I have argued in Chapter II, intuition is a cognitive 
process with recognizable stages which (Bergson all too 
vaguely suggests) does not dispense with symbols, but adopts 
a curious variety of them. When Bergson recommends that the 
mind employ "fluid concepts," he does not forsake conceptual 
symbols but encourages a radical rethinking of them; he does 
not deny the possibility of expressing one's intuition, but 
demands a reinterpretation of conventional expressive forms. 
This notion of the fluid concept, albeit obliquely stated 
in Bergson's texts, contains the germ of a new theory of 
human thought and expression. 
Bergson so long belabored the problems of the con-
ventional concept employed in analysis, that he gave little 
attention to delineating the new concept appropriate to 
intuition. One positive effect of this disproportionate 
1It is especially alarming that Susanne K. Langer, 
who is usually such an intelligent and perceptive reader of 
Bergson, subscribes to this view. Feeling and Form (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 375. Philosoph~ in 
a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 73), 
p. 98. See also Jacques Maritain, Bergsonian Philosolh~ and 
Thomism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 6 . 
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interest was that, as he more clearly discerned the defi-
ciencies of the ordinary concept, he became better able to 
establish the guidelines for what the new concept should be. 
Accordingly Bergson defines the new concept in terms of two 
characteristics: its ability to grasp the particularity 
and concreteness of an object; and its ability to become 
fluid, molding itself to the mobile duration of existing 
things. Unfortunately, these two criteria receive no spe-
cific illustration by Bergson. In a few scattered and 
fragmentary passages, Bergson does hint that language, music 
and the visual arts may be adapted to the requirements of 
the "fluid concept." The nature of this adaption, however, 
is never explained. 
These enigmatic texts hold the key to Bergson's 
theory of the "new concept." If one can determine the 
linguistic, musical and artistic forms which accormnodate the 
fluid concept and meet its requirements, then one will, in 
effect, disclose the logical form by which particularity and 
fluidity are conceived in intuition. By examining these 
three expressive forms, I hope to show that the notion of 
the "fluid concept" has a viable and intelligible philo-
sophic meaning, and that, as a result, the intuitive process 
to which it is integral can be divested of its mystery and 
obscurity, and Bergson's rather innovative philosophy of 
expression can be seen in a clearer light. 
Any attempt to decipher the "fluid concept" must 
...... ______ --~----
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necessarily be venturesome. Bergson's treatment of this 
notion is so abstruse and incomplete that any coherent 
interpretation of it must reach beyond his texts. The sub-
sequent discussion, therefore, will draw from certain aes-
theticians and philosophers of language whose theories of 
language, music and art seem consistent with Bergson's 
position, and yet capable of extending its basic meaning. 
These supplementary theories will lend Bergson the vocabu-
lary and models for delineating the "fluid concept" which 
his own philosophy so sorely lacks. 
Language 
When Bergson critizes language for its static and 
general character, he is referring to what linguists and 
aestheticians call the discursiveness of language. Susanne 
K. Langer offers a classic description of discursiveness in 
her early work Philosophy in a New Key (1942): 
Language in the strict sense is essentially discursive; 
it has permanent units of meaning which are combinable 
into larger units; it has fixed equivalences that make 
definition and translation possible; its connotations 
are general, so that it requires non-verbal acts, like 
pointing, looking, or emphatic voice-inflections, to 
assign specific denotations to its terms.2 
Bergson's entire critique of conceptual thought and its 
linguistic symbolism focuses precisely on these two features 
of ordinary semantics, namely, that the word is a "permanent 
2 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 96-97. 
Italics mine. 
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unit of meaning" which, once defined, is relatively invar-
iable; and further, that the word exhibits generality in so 
far as its meaning is broad enough to encompass numerous 
particular things. 3 The stability characteristic of word 
meanings is also evident in the form of words and the syn-
tactical structure of propositions. Langer's description 
of the formal properties of discursive language exactly fits 
Bergson's model of a linear, spatial symbolism: 
words have a linear, discrete, successive order; they 
are strung together one after another like beads on a 
rosary; beyond the very limited meanings of inflections 
which can be incorporated in the words themselves, we 
cannot talk in simultaneous bunches of names. We must 
name one thing and then another . . . all language has 
a form which requires us to string out our ideas even 
though their objects rest one within the other .... 
This property of verbal symbolism is known as discur-
siveness; by reason of it, only thoughts which can be 
arranged in this particular order can be spoken at 
all ... 4 
The demarcation and isolation of words within definite 
3Bergson's criticism of discursive language bears 
principally upon its referential uses, its naming or de-
noting of things. Since Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philo-
sophical Investigations (1945-49) first challenged the 
theory that the principal function of language is naming, 
philosophers have recognized that its uses are far broader 
than simple reference. John Austin, for example, discusses 
"performative" language, such as promising, rebuking, bet-
ting, vowing, pardoning, thanking, predicting and apolo-
gizing, in which the words are performing an act rather 
than referring to the performance itself. Such analysis 
points to the fact that language has multiple uses, only 
one of which is that of denoting and naming. Bergson's 
insensitivity to these distinctions is explained by the 
fact that his own work predates these discoveries. 
4Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 80-81. 
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boundaries betray the essentially static character of dis-
cursive linguistic forms. When the mind, operating accord-
ing to its cinematographical habits, strings together these 
discrete units in propositions, there results only a linear 
succession of immobilities, external and in juxtaposition 
to one another. In short, discursive language is a type of 
expression which, being relatively invariable in form and 
meaning, renders static whatever is fluid and mobile, and 
being general in its signification, never exactly expresses 
the particular features of individual objects. As Bergson 
criticizes language for failing to deliver fully the en-
during world one grasps immediately in intuition, he is 
criticizing the fundamental discursiveness of ordinary 
language. 
When Bergson recommends that intuition abandon the 
ordinary concepts of analysis and create new fluid concepts, 
what he is suggesting, in terms of language, is that one 
replace discursive with non-discursive linguistic forms. 
Since Bergson's criticism of discursive language bears upon 
both the meaning and form of words, upon both semantics and 
syntax, it is necessary to explore non-discursive uses of 
language which pertain to word meanings, as well as to 
those involving structural or syntactical modifications. 
This twofold reassessment of language will show that its 
non-discursive expressive forms fulfill the requirements 
of Bergson's "fluid concept," thereby giving that elusive 
- --------- --- -
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notion some specific sense. 
The classic move away from the permanence and gen-
erality of discursive word meanings is the metaphor. Each 
of the three major theories of metaphor I will review here 
explains at least in part how language can, on the level of 
meaning, achieve the concreteness and fluidity which Bergson 
recommends to the new concept. 5 At times these theories 
simply will serve to give a sharper articulation to a vague 
suggestion Bergson has made; at other times, they will dis-
close possibilities which Bergson himself did not envision, 
but which remain consistent with his basic view. The three 
theories under consideration are: 
1. The Comparison View of metaphor, a designation 
given by Max Black to describe the theory inherited from 
Aristotle. I will draw from the language studies of Max 
5My designation of three theories of metaphor is 
slightly at variance with the four types of metaphor set 
out by Monroe C. Beardsley in ~article "Metaphor," 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed. The discrepancy is due 
not to a disagreement on the fundamental issues so much as 
a different organization of them and different designations 
for them. While both of us treat the "Comparison View" by 
that name, my use of Black's "Interaction Theory" includes 
issues which Beardsley deals with separately under the 
"Iconic-Signification Theory" and the "Verbal Opposition 
Theory." I neglect to analyze explicitly the "Emotive 
Theory" to which Beardsley refers. Its exclusion is due 
to the serious problems with the theory which Beardsley 
outlines in his article. My addition of Wheelwright's 
"Diaphoric View" is grounded in the fact that it has im-
portant implications for Bergson's philosophy. In his 
"Verbal Opposition Theory" Beardsley recognizes the dynamics 
of diaphor, but fails to define fully its distinctive work. 
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Black, Susanne Langer and Philip Wheelwright to explain the 
essential features of the comparison view. While Bergson 
explicitly acknowledges that this metaphoric use of language 
achieves a certainconcr~teness in grasping its objects, he 
is critical of the inherent generality from which it never 
entirely escapes. 
2. The second theory, which involves a reinterpre-
tation of the first, holds more promise. Once again, 
Black's descriptive title, the Interaction View, is most 
apt. Both Black and Wheelwright suggest that a close look 
at the workings of the conventional metaphor will show that 
a vital tension between the metaphoric word and its object 
circumvents the problem of generality and, in addition, 
accounts for a semantic fluidity unattainable in the simpler 
comparison view. 
3. Third is a theory for which there is, as yet, no 
convenient label. Wheelwright's term Diaphor will have to 
suffice. Both Wheelwright and Langer analyze the effect of 
accumulating diverse images to describe a single object, 
person or event. Bergson alludes to this view, and, al-
though he recognizes its strength, he does not see its full 
import for the theory of the fluid concept. 
Comparison View 
The Comparison View of metaphor is first enunciated 
in Aristotle's Poetics: "Metaphor consists in giving the 
thing a name that belongs to something else." (1947b) This 
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terse explanation survives in contemporary theories of 
language where it is amplified and given more definite de-
scription. In Philosophy in a New Key, Susanne Langer ex-
plains metaphor as the use of one word, for which there is 
a precise literal meaning, to denote another kind of object 
or event in a non-literal or figurative sense. Metaphor 
consists in taking a word or phrase whose meaning is com-
prehensible and transferring it to something which "has no 
name of its own. 116 Philip Wheelwright describes the same 
metaphorical use of language, but broadens it to include 
reference to little known, as well as unknown, aspects of 
experience. For this type of metaphor, he prefers the more 
exact term epiphor. 
Epiphoric metaphor starts by assuming a usual meaning 
for a word; it then applies this word to something else 
on the basis of, and in order to indicate, a comparison 
with what is familiar. The semantic "movement" (p@ora) 
here is characteristically from a more concrete an 
readily graspable image "over on to" (epi) what is per-
haps vaguer, more problematic, or more strange.7 
6Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 139-41. In tracing 
the life of a metaphor, Langer notes its eventual obsoles-
cence. "Every new experience or new idea about things, 
evokes first of all some metaphorical expression. As the 
idea becomes familiar, this expression 'fades' to a new, 
literal use.'' (p. 141) In the context of Philosophy in a 
New Key, Langer adopts her theory of metaphor from Philip 
Wegener, Untersuchungen uber die Grundfragen des Sprach-
lebens, 1885. 
7Philip Wheelwright, Meta~hor and Reality, (Bloom-
inton, Ind.: Indiana Universityress, 1962), pp. 72-73. 
Cf. James M. Edie, "Expression and Metaphor," Philoso,hical 
and Phenomenological Research, XXIII (June, 1963), 54 -48. 
r 
' 
' 
""'-
70 
Epiphor occurs in the semantic transference, in the "move-
ment" of the familiar image "over on to" the less well 
known object to which it is compared. For example, when we 
say "A mighty fortress is our God," we are comparing the 
relatively unknown and ineffable God to a "mighty fortress," 
attempting thereby to convey His strength and majesty. The 
fortress does not give a literal definition of God, but 
makes him more intelligible by suggesting his likeness to 
a familiar object. 
In his book Models and Metaphors from which the 
term "comparison view" is taken, Max Black offers an explan-
ation of metaphor which is generally commensurate with 
those already cited. 8 There are two additional elaborations 
which Black's discussion offers. First of all, his example 
"Richard is a lion" suggests that both terms of the compar-
ison can be familiar, in which case the metaphor is some-
thing other than the application of a familiar word to an 
unfamiliar object. The lion-like features of Richard are 
8Max Black, Models and Metaphors, (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 35-36. Black finds the 
"comparison view" to be a particular form of the broader 
"substitution view" of metaphor. The distinction is of 
minor importance. In the "substitution view" the metaphoric 
word is used in place of a literal designation, since none 
is available. There is, in this case simply a substitution 
of one word for another. The "comparison view" is only a 
more complex form of substitution wherein the likeness 
between the metaphoric word and its referent is implied. 
Similarly, "the metaphorical statement might be replaced 
by an equivalent literal comparison. 
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not necessarily discovered for the first time, as if un-
known, but they are merely accentuated when his likeness 
to the lion is drawn. Secondly, Black emphasizes that such 
"a metaphor consists in the presentation of the underlying 
analogy or similarity" between the subject and the meta-
phoric word by which it is described. The characteristics 
· which the predicate term denotes and connotes are then 
transferred to the subject. Although this view of metaphor 
"as condensed simile or comparison" is quite popular, Black 
finds it simplistic in so far as the metaphoric word or 
phrase is merely a substitute or proxy for one or more 
literal statements by which it could be readily replaced. 9 
The metaphoric word is simply a stand-in for a more elab-
orate literal paraphrase. 
In all instances of the comparative metaphor~wheth-
er it applies to what is unknown, vaguely known or familiar~ 
it has at least this advantage, that it gives a vivid con-
crete sense of the object to which it refers. Bergson him-
self explicitly recognizes this metaphoric use of language 
and finds that, unlike the ordinary concept which is general 
and abstract, the metaphor or "image" as he prefers to call 
9 Models and Metaphors, pp. 35-36. 
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it, 10 "keeps us in the concrete. 1111 For example, when Berg-
son describes duration by comparing it to "the unrolling of 
a coil," "a myriad-tinted spectrum" or "an elastic body," 
he attempts to provide images of his metaphysical duree 
which will make more intelligible and more tangible its 
basic features. 12 Rather than relying exclusively on ab-
stract terminology, Bergson draws a comparison with familiar, 
accessible objects from everyday life to evoke a sense of 
what duration is. 
But even to Bergson the limitations of the metaphor 
are evident. In at least one respect, it is prone to the 
same deficiency as the ordinary concept. Since the image, 
like the concept, involves comparison it is necessarily 
incomplete, expressing some dimensions of its object while 
omitting others. 13 Bergson's argument is that comparison 
makes manifest a resemblance, "resemblance is a property 
of the object, and as a property has every appearance of 
10Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 30; 
Creative Evolution, p. 348; Creative Mind, pp. 42-43, 80. 
Bergson makes a crucial distinction between a "present 
image" or object, and a "represented image" or symbol of an 
object. Obviously the second meaning is operative here. 
11rntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 27, Cf. Creative 
Mind, pp. 42-43. 
.. _____________ _ 
12Introduction: to Metaphysics, pp. 25-26. 
13Ibid., p. 27 . 
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. t f h b . h. h . t 14 being ~ o t e o Ject w ic possesses i . Any com-
parison requires that an image be distinct from its object, 
and yet similar to it; if an image were identical to its 
object, or yet if an image did not somehow resemble it, 
there would be no basis for comparison. Consequently an 
image discloses those aspects of an object with which it 
bears resemblance, but reveals nothing of those aspects 
with which it has no affinity. Thus, Bergson finds that 
each of the images he employs to describe duration gives 
only a partial view of what duration is. One image expres-
ses its heterogeneity but sacrifices its continuous move-
ment; the other expresses movement but sacrifices hetero-
geneity. 
If I use the comparison of the spectrum with its thou-
sand shades, I have before me a thing already made, 
whilst duration is continually in the making. If I 
think of an elastic which is being stretched, or of a 
spring which is extended or relaxed, I forget the rich-
ness of color, characteristic of duration that is lived, 
to see only the simple movement by which consciousness 
passes from one shade to another.15 
Bergson finds that no single comparison can convey the unity 
and multiplicity of an enduring process without neglecting 
one aspect or the other. Since the image is both like and 
14Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 27. When Bergson 
states that "resemblance is a property of the object," what 
he means is that resemblance is a relational property which 
the objects possess insofar as they are related through the 
metaphoric comparison. 
15Ibid., p. 27. 
-
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unlike the object to which it is compared, it is able to 
give a concrete sense only of the particular properties they 
share. Accordingly the comparative metaphor is always in-
complete. 
A second criticism of the metaphor is leveled by 
Max Black. It is most damaging to Bergson's cause because 
it questions the concreteness he is trying to affirm. 
Black states that "The main objection against a comparison 
view is that it suffers from a vagueness that borders on 
vacuity . likeness always admits of degrees." Black 
argues that metaphor is incapable of precision; in fact we 
h . h h . . . . bl 16 use metap or in sue cases w ere precision is unattaina e. 
The previous comparison between God and "a mighty fortress" 
makes the point obvious. While "a mighty fortress" vividly 
suggests certain characteristics of God and brings them 
into clearer focus, it does not enumerate them nor give 
them explicit description. A metaphor is essentially 
evocative. It calls forth certain features of its object, 
but does not delineate them with scientific exactitude. 
What does a metaphoric comparison contribute to 
Bergson's 'fluid concept?" Does it achieve the concrete 
and fluid grasp of the objects that Bergson is seeking? 
The metaphor clearly moves away from bland abstraction 
toward more vital and more concrete imagery, but this move 
16 Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 37. 
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appears to be limited in what it achieves. If Bergson's 
criticism is accurate, comparison does not deliver its 
object entirely, though it does make several of its traits 
more recognizable and more immediate. Black's criticism 
raises more serious problems since it attacks the claim to 
concreteness which Bergson presumes. Black seems to be 
correct in suggesting that the metaphor is a poor literal 
substitute~that it is attended with a certain semantic 
ambiguity that makes it inexact and elusive. This is, to 
Black's mind, precisely the problem in viewing metaphor as 
a proxy for literal meaning. One is in effect asking the 
metaphor to be something it is not intended to be. What is 
at stake is not the concreteness of the metaphoric image 
at all, but its inability to be reduced to an exact literal 
equivalent. The comparison view makes the fatal mistake of 
assuming that a literal translation of the metaphor is pos-
sible, even desirable. The two subsequent theories of 
metaphor will show that it is not. By developing a more 
sophisticated, incisive view of the workings of metaphor, 
the criticisms made by both Bergson and Black are, to a 
large extent, circumvented by more adequate linguistic 
formulations for the "fluid concept." 
Interaction View 
The Interaction View of metaphor is a designation 
once again borrowed from Max Black, who, in turn, credits 
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I. A. Richards with the fundamentals of the theory. 17 Its 
basic tenet is that an expression like "Man is a wolf" 
works metaphorically due to a semantic interaction between 
the two terms. Black claims that attached to the word 
"wolf" is what he calls a system of associated commonplaces, 
which includes everything held to be true about wolves 
which would immediately come to one's mind upon hearing 
the word. 18 While having this store of associations pre-
sumes some familiarity with the concept "wolf," it does 
not require a knowledge of the standard dictionary meaning 
nor a firm sense of its literal denotative uses. As Black 
explains, "the system of commonplaces may include half-
truths or downright mistakes . . . but the important thing 
for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the common-
places shall be true, but that they should be readily and 
freely evoked. 1119 The metaphorical expression "Man is a 
wolf," calls up "the wolf-system of related commonplaces" 
and extends them to the principal subject, man. 
Cf. I. 
Oxford 
17 See Max Black, Models and Metaphors, 
A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 
University Press, 1965), pp. 89-138. 
18Models and Metaphors, p. 40. 
pp. 38-44. 
(New York: 
19Ibid., p. 40. Black does allow that a novelist or 
poet can "establish a novel pattern of implications for the 
literal uses of the key expressions prior to using them as 
vehicles for his metaphors." In other words, "Metaphors can 
be supported by specially constructed systems of implica-
tions, as well as by accepted commonplaces." (p. 43) 
A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of 
implications to construct a corresponding system of 
implications about the principal subject. But these 
implications will not be those comprised in the com-
monplaces normally implied by literal uses of "man." 
. . . Any human traits that can without undue strain 
be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered 
prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into 
the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some 
details, emphasizes others~in short, organizes our 
view of man. 20 
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Black sees the metaphoric word as a kind of filter through 
which the principal subject is seen. What occurs is a 
transformation of the literal meanings of both terms: the 
subject, man, is not given a literal definition, but is 
characterized by the rich, though startling implications 
of the predicate "wolf;" the term "wolf" accordingly is 
applied in a non-literal sense, exploring the wide range 
of associations which hover over the word. The result is 
a semantic blend, a new "system" of meaning, which is irre-
ducible to a literal translation of either term. 21 
20 Models and Metaphors, p. 41. 
21see Models and Metaphors, p. 46. "Suppose we try 
to state the cognitive content of an interaction-metaphor 
in 'plain language.,. Up to a point, we may succeed in 
stating a number of relevant relations between the two sub-
jects .... But the set of literal statements so obtained 
will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the 
original. For one thing, the implications, previously left 
for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a nice 
feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of impor-
tance, are now presented explicitly as though having equal 
weight. The literal paraphrase inevitably says too much~ 
and with the wrong emphasis. One of the points I most wish 
to stress is that the loss in such cases is a loss in cog-
nitive content; the relevant weakness of the literal para-
phrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or boringly 
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A similar theory of semantic interaction is devel-
oped by Philip Wheelwright. 22 He maintains that words over-
come the rigidity of their discursive meanings by plurisig-
nation, which occurs when 
more than one meaning is suggested simultaneously by a 
certain word or phrase or image. Or, more character-
istically, there may be a group of verbal symbols. put 
together in a certain syntax and suggesting certain 
images, some more overtly than others, with the result 
that the intertllay of meaninys and half-meanings is far 
more co ious t an an litera ara hrase could ever 
Wheelwright joins Black in recognizing in language the same 
semantic possibilities: that a single image or set of 
images can exploit the multiple meanings which attend them, 
and, when used effectively. can create a vast "interplay" 
of associations. Plurisignation involves precisely this 
mobilization and blend of meanings. which always exceeds 
explicit (or deficient in qualities of style); it fails to 
give the insight that the metaphor did." 
This untranslatability of metaphor has given rise to 
what philosophers call the Double-Language thesis, which 
holds that there are two different forms of language, the 
literal and the metaphorical, each of which is irreducible 
to the other. Monroe Beardsley is correct in finding the 
Double-Language thesis operative in Bergson's philosophy. 
As he states, "there is a language of mechanism and a whole 
distinct language of the elan vital;" the former is clearly 
the more literal discursive language, the latter the lan-
guage of metaphor. (Beardsley, "Metaphor.") 
22The theory is first introduced by Wheelwright's 
Metaphor and Reality, pp. 57-65, and is more fully devel-
oped in his later work The Burning Fountain (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1968). pp. 115-19. 
23Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 57. 
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what the word or phrase literally says. 24 
The interaction view of metaphor has this advantage, 
that it accounts for a semantic fluidity, an interplay of 
word meanings, which is infinitely more complex and effec-
tive than the simple substitution of one word for another 
proposed in the comparison view. The interaction view 
acknowledges that words are a constellation of denotations, 
connotations and commonplace associations. A metaphoric 
comparison evokes these multiple meanings of the terms 
compared and incites their interplay. What results is a 
new metaphorical meaning with a unique emotional texture 
which is irreducible to the sum of the meanings of the re-
spective terms. The success of the metaphor conceived as a 
dynamic interaction is hard to predict, principally because 
it rests on subjective factors. To one who is semi-literate 
or vaguely familiar with the language, or to one whose range 
of experience is limited, a metaphorical expression may 
24Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 242. Langer, 
borrowing the vocabulary of Freud, speaks of over-determin-
ation of words, meaning thereby that the same word can 
have more than one import. An interesting addition to the 
theories of Black and Wheelwright is the "ambivalence" of 
words, their power to express at once two contradictory 
affects. As Langer states, "I believe the power of artistic 
forms to be emotionally ambivalent springs from the fact 
that emotional opposites--joy and grief, desire and fear, 
and so forth--are of ten very similar in their dynamic 
structure, and reminiscent of each other. Small shifts of 
expression can bring them together, and show their intimate 
relations to each other, whereas literal description can 
only emphasize their separateness." 
----
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border on total meaninglessness; on the other hand, to 
another who knows the language well and whose long experi-
ence has built up a strong store of "commonplace associa-
tions," the simplest metaphorical phrase can be highly 
suggestive and rich in meaning. One's ability to exploit 
the full sense of the metaphoric comparison to a large ex-
tent determines the depth of meaning it finally delivers. 
But how concrete and complete a grasp of an object 
does this semantic fluidity allow? There is little doubt 
that calling a man a wolf is more concrete and vivid than 
saying, more prosaically, that he is dangerous and quick 
to anger. The term "wolf," charged with emotional over-
tones and a wealth of associations, gives certain of the 
man's characteristics an immediacy and presence which less 
figurative language is not empowered to do. Considerably 
more problematic, however, is the question of how complete 
a grasp of an object one gains by any metaphorical expres-
sion. As Bergson recognizes, a comparison exaggerates 
some features of its object, while others recede and go 
unnoticed. This partiality can only be remedied by a third 
type of metaphor which collects several images around a 
particular object, evoking its full particularity by a 
fusion of traits borrowed from these numerous comparisons. 
Diaphoric View 
In order to identify this third type of metaphor, 
I borrow Philip Wheelwright's term diaphor. Wheelwright 
... 
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explains that in diaphor "the 'movement' (phora) is 
'through' (dia) certain particulars of experience (actual 
or imagined) in a fresh way, producing new meaning by jux-
taposition alone. 1125 This is the familiar technique of 
the novelist and poet who gather numerous diverse images 
which converge to evoke a particular person, feeling or 
place. Susanne Langer offers the most lucid analysis of 
how diaphor actually works. Her example is a Chinese poem 
"A Farewell in the Evening Rain." 
Is it raining on the river all the way to Ch'u?--
The evening bell comes to us from Nan-king. 
Your wet sail drags and is loath to be going 
And shadowy birds are flying slow. 
We cannot see the deep ocean-gate--
Only the boughs of Pu-kou, newly dripping. 
Likewise, because of our great love, 
There are threads of water on our faces. 26 
Langer finds that all imagery in the poem works together 
to create a single virtual event, a semblance of the actual 
experience of lovers departing. The poet is not merely 
describing a setting, he is building image upon image~ 
each tinged with weightiness and sadness~which all to-
gether evoke the deep emotion which attends "farewell." 
As Langer explains, 
The rain on the river, in the sails, on the obstructing 
25Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 78. Cf. 
p. 72 where Wheelwright more accurately explains the work 
of diaphor as involving not only the juxtaposition of 
images but also their synthesis. 
26Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 215 . 
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boughs, finally becomes a flow of tears. It is 
brought in through the poem, in approximately every 
other line, so that the further items~the bell, the 
shadowy birds, the invisible ocean-gate~merge with 
it, and are consequently gathered up with it into the 
great love for which the whole poem is weeping. Fur-
thermore, those apparently casual local events inter-
spersed between the rain-lines are all symbols of the 
bond that makes parting painful. Nan-king is calling; 
the sail is heavy, sailing is hard; the birds, which 
are going away, are slow, and they are shadowy~The 
shadow; the "deep ocean-gate," the greater place that 
is Li Ts'ao's next destination, is not to be seen for 
the near precious place, "the boughs of Pu-kou," ob-
structing all interest in the venture. And so the 
apparently simple description builds up to the con-
fession of human feeling ... 27 
Langer's explication clearly shows how the poem's diverse 
images combine to create the feeling of sorrow. At no time 
does the poet explicitly refer to the emotion~there is no 
literal description of it. Rather, its several images 
work together metaphorically to evoke the feeling itself. 
In Wheelwright's terminology, the sadness of the farewell 
is the "presiding image," or perhaps better, the "presiding 
theme" which creates the diaphoric synthesis. 28 The unity 
of the poem is intrinsic to the imagery itself. Each image 
within the poem, in its distinctive way, points to the same 
27Feeling and Form, pp. 215-16. 
28Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 83. Langer 
adds that even in poems like T. S. Eliot's "The Love Song 
of J. Alfred Prufrock" where the imagery is disjointed, the 
reader should be able to find its convergence in a definite 
type of "presented 'world."' If this focus is unattainable, 
Langer suggests that there is either something wrong with 
the poem or with the reader's literary comprehension. 
(Feeling and Form, p. 217) -
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presiding emotion. Taken together, they form one coherent 
metaphorical expression for the experience and feeling of 
farewell. 29 
With much less attention to how the diaphoric syn-
thesis occurs, Bergson himself finds the use of diaphor 
advantageous. Having recognized the inadequacy of em-
ploying any one image to deliver fully the notion of pure 
duration, Bergson goes on to suggest that numerous, diverse 
images together may facilitate a more complete grasp of 
pure duration. As he states in Introduction to Metaphysics, 
No image can replace the intuition of duration, but 
many diverse images borrowed from very different orders 
of things may, by the convergence of their action, 
direct consciousness to the precise point where there 
is a certain intuition to be seized.30 
The technique of the novelist and poet is similar. Bergson 
finds that they expand upon a single feeling or idea by 
creating numerous images which, in turn, combine to evoke 
the essential simplicity of the original intuition. 31 What 
29Wheelwright compares the workings of the diaphoric 
image to the combining of elements in nature. In some pre-
historic time, when hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms combined 
to produce water, a new substance came into existence through 
the synthesis of disparate elements; so too in literature, 
new constellations of previously unjoined images create new 
suggestions of meaning. (Metaphor and Reality, pp. 83-85) 
30Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 27-28. 
31Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 15, 164; Intro-
duction to MetaphysICS, p. 22; Creative Evolution, pp. 228, 
348. 
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Bergson is alluding to in these texts is the diaphoric 
theory of metaphor, the precise workings of which he never 
explains. The more incisive analysis of Wheelwright and 
Langer discussed above, accounting as they do for the unity 
of the diaphoric imagery, are necessary to substantiate and 
complete Bergson's vague suggestion. 
What then does the diaphor contribute to Bergson's 
theory of the "new concept?" First of all, there is im-
plicit in the diaphoric process a certain semantic fluidity, 
insofar as the meaning which finally emerges permeates, or 
"flows through," the multiple images which are collected 
to evoke it. That is one reason why there is often no 
single correct interpretation of a novel or poem. Its 
meaning is read off the several images the artist presents; 
when an interpreter emphasizes one image or set of images 
over another, or probes their import from a different per-
spective, there often are subtle shifts in the overall 
meaning. While the imagery in a unified poem obviously 
does not allow for just any random interpretation, it does 
provide for a latitude of possible interpretations within 
the limits of what the imagery can express. 
The concreteness which Bergson requires of the 
"fluid concept" is evident here as it was in the comparison 
and interaction views. Whether one compares a man to a 
wolf or describes sorrow in terms of "shadowy birds flying 
slow" and "threads of water on our faces," one in either 
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case avoids the generality of more literal statements and 
creates instead a more vivid, tangible and immediate sense 
of the object expressed. Furthermore, Bergson intimates 
that when multiple images converge on a single reality, 
that reality is not only expressed more concretely, but 
also more completely. His instinct seems correct. If each 
of the several images accentuates certain characteristics 
of an object, the aspects it neglects can be emphasized by 
another, and so on indefinitely. The collective effect is 
a relatively complete grasp of the object. far exceeding 
that attained in either of the other uses of metaphor. 
A final consideration in our study of the adapta-
bility of language to the "fluid concept" is the prospect 
of a structural modification of language itself. When 
Bergson demands of the intuitive mind that it recast all 
its categories, do violence to itself and to language, 32 
he urges a radical restructuring of conventional discourse 
in which inert, individual words, with well-defined bound-
aries and meanings, stand side by side in predictable log-
ical sequence. While there are those who argue that the 
form of words need not be adapted to their meaning, that 
words need not be harsh to express harshness or be wet to 
32 See n. 59, Chapter II, especially Introduction to 
Metaphysics, p. 51; Creative Evolution, p. 35; Creative 
Mind, p. 61; Two Sources, p. 254. 
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express wetness, 33 their criticism seems to be directed 
toward a simple imitative technique like onomatopoeia 
rather than toward the more elaborate experimentation with 
linguistic form which has been undertaken successfully in 
contemporary literature. The latter will be especially 
significant for Bergson's theory by showing that liberation 
from rigid discursive· forms can result in a liberation from 
the confines of static denotative meanings as well; the 
combined effect will be a linguistic fluidity and concrete-
ness appropriate to the "new concept." 
Bergson's explicit recommendation regarding the 
structural re-formation of language is cautious. Its focus 
is primarily upon the rhythm and flow of the sentence which, 
he suggests, determines its effectiveness in conveying a 
meaning. 
The words may then have been well chosen, they will not 
convey the whole of what we wish to make them say if we 
do not succeed by the rhythm, by the punctuation, by 
the relative lengths of the sentences and parts of the 
sentences, by a particular dancing of the sentence, in 
making the reader's mind, continually guided by a series 
of nascent movements, describe a curve of thought and 
33r was first struck by this point while attending 
a lecture by Arthur Danto entitled "Language, God and Real-
ity in Nietzsche's Philosophy" (Nietzsche Conference, 
DePaul University, Chicago, November 24, 1972). Danto made 
explicit reference to Bergson's naivete in assuming this 
direct correlation between word structure and word meaning. 
See also Susanne Langer, Philoso}hy in a New Key, p. 81; 
George Boas, "Bergson (1859-1941 and His Predecessors," 
Journal of the History of Ideas, XX (1959), 505. 
feeling analogous to that we ourselves describe. 34 
Susanne Langer, extending Bergson's basic insight, speaks 
of more radical structural changes which she describes as 
condensation of symbols: "it is essentially a fusion of 
forms themselves by intersection, contraction, elision, 
. d h d . 35 L suppression an many ot er evices. anger proposes an 
interplay and fusion of word forms in a variety of ways, 
which involve not only slight syntactical modifications, 
but a fundamental breakdown of the word structures them-
selves. 
The classic example of such an experiment with 
language is James Joyce's Finnegans Wake. In Part I, 
Joyce describes Finnegan: 
Of the first was he to bear arms and a name: 
Wassaily Booselaeugh of Riesengeborg. His crest 
of huroldry, in vert with ancillars, troubland, 
argent,a hegoak,poursuivant,horrid,horned. His 
scutschum fessed, with archers strung, helio, of 
the second. Hootch is for husbandman handling his 
how. Hohohoho, Mister Finn, you're going to be 
Mister Finnagainl Comeday morn and, O,you're vine! 
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34Bergson, Mind Energy, pp. 56-57. Archibald Mac-
Leish makes the same point more clearly in Poetry and 
Exgerience (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1960 , p. 23. 
"Te poem's meaning is evoked by the structure of words-
as-sounds rather than by the structure of words-as-meanings. 
And the enhancement of meaning, which we feel in any true 
poem, is a product, therefore, of the structure of sounds." 
. . 
35Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 244. Cf. Philosothy 
in a New Key, p. 133, n. 46, where Langer remarks upon te 
"conglomerations of words and babble" still found in drink-
ing and cheering songs. 
r 
' 
Sendday's eve and,ah,you're vinegar! Hahahaha~ 
Mister Funn, you're going to be fined again!3o 
Indeed Joyce's scramble of sound and sense, his foreign 
words, half-words, non-words and all manner of neologism 
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in effect "do violence to language." The result is a fluid 
rhythmic prose in which the ordinary form of words is dis-
rupted and restructured in most unconventional ways. The 
semantic consequence of this, as the critic Eugene Jolas 
explains, is that Joyce "has been occupied in exploding the 
antique logic of words. 1137 While the passage conveys a 
sense of Finnegan, numerous words therein cannot literally be 
defined. The meaning is "fluid" since it is evoked by the 
play of sound and rhythm and the vague suggestions of 
ordinary language. 
Another more familiar example (for only the critics 
read Finnegans Wake) is Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky." 
'Twas brillig, and the slithy troves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogroves, 
And the mome raths outgrabe. 
"Beware the Jabberwock, my son! 
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch! 
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun 
The frumious Bandersnatch!" 
36James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1939), p. 5. 
37EuRene Jolas, "The Revolution of Language and 
James Joyce, ' James Jo ce, Finne ans Wake: A S osium 
(New York: New Directions, 19 9 , p. 83. 
r 
' 
He took his vorpal sword in hand; 
Long time the manxome foe he sought--
So rested he by the Tumtum tree, 
And stood awhile in thought. 
And, as in uffish thought he stood, 
The Jabberwock with eyes of flame, 
Came whiffing through the tulgey wood, 
And burbled as he came! 
One,twol One,two! And through and through 
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack! 
He left it dead,and with its head 
He went galumphing back. 
"And hast thou slain the Jabberwock? 
Come to my arms, my beamish boy! 
0 frabjous day! Calloh! Callay!" 
He chortled in his joy. 
"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogroves, 38 And the mome raths outgrabe. 
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In undermining conventional word forms, Carroll adopts a 
more sensuous and playful language than does Joyce, whose 
prose is an intellectual exercise in deciphering layers of 
implications and multi-lingual puns. Like Joyce, however, 
Carroll not only achieves a stylistic fluidity but he simul-
taneously erodes the rigidity and generality characteristic 
of word meanings. Once the ordinary structure of word and 
syntax disappears, the relatively fixed meanings which 
result from formulating a definition and circumscribing 
words within a tidy denotative meaning begin to deteri-
orate. The meaning of the new "words" is fluid in the 
38Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice (New York: 
Bramhall House, 1960), pp. 191, 197. 
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sense that it finds no firm and changeless definition. 
Rather, it is expressive by sound sense and rhythm, which 
play on conventional meanings while not being reducible to 
them. Since there is no general definition to which to 
appeal, the meaning of the "word" is specified by the con-
text in which it appears. It takes on a particular sense 
in relation to the other non-words which surround it. Such 
experimental language, though untranslatable into the 
general terms of ordinary discursive language, does retain 
a communicative value. Consequently, with alterations in 
linguistic form, words and propositions assume a structural 
fluidity which, in turn, engenders a certain fluidity in 
meaning. In addition, the collapse of conventional forms 
and their denotative meanings results in a breakdown of 
semantic generality. Since every use of the new language 
is a peculiar constellation of meanings, it gains concrete-
ness by the particular fusion of rhythms and sounds and 
half-meanings which is unique to every literary passage. 
Language, therefore, contains several modes of ex-
pression which attain the semantic fluidity, concreteness, 
and thoroughness which Bergson requires of the "fluid 
concept." The three metaphoric uses of language, taken 
together, meet each of these criteria, whereas the collapse 
of conventional linguistic structure achieves concreteness, 
as well as a syntactical and semantic fluidity. Since 
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language is the principal vehicle for conceiving and ex-
pressing intuitive thought, these adaptations bear the 
burden of proof for the viability of the intuitive method. 
The "fluid concept," which is the vehicle of intuition, has 
attai~ed, at least in terms of language, an intelligible 
and defensible philosophic meaning. 
Music 
According to Bergson, music is especially suited 
to expressing the fluid continuity of existing things. His 
observation is grounded in the fact that music is essen-
tially temporal, and its sonorous movement through time 
exhibits a continuity and qualitative variation that makes 
it the very model of duration itself. Unfortunately, Berg-
son's view is seriously incomplete in that it deals only 
with music's formal properties of temporal continuity and 
heterogeneity, while neglecting its semantic power which is 
inseparable from them. By avoiding any reference to meaning 
in music, Bergson overlooks two additional characteristics 
which make music amenable to fluid conceptualization, 
namely, that music is fluid in meaning as well as form, and 
also that through its distinctive semantic it can express 
vividly our thoughts and feelings. By analyzing Bergson's 
conunents on musical form, and by going beyond Bergson's 
texts to examine the fluidity and concreteness of musical 
meaning, I will show that music is a mode of expression 
entirely appropriate to Bergson's "fluid concept." 
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Bergson's discussion of music presumes that reading 
a musical score and listening to the music performed can be 
significantly different experiences. On the one hand, the 
musical score presents its reader with a linear succession 
of discrete notes which, when played, become translated into 
definite positions along a string or keyboard. Viewed as 
a system of ordered notations, music is obviously a type of 
symbolic representation whose juxtaposition of discrete 
points along a line is similar to the other spatial models 
which the intellect unsuccessfully employs to represent the 
continuous movement of time. 39 On the other hand, when 
listening to music without visualizing the score or key-
board, one experiences the interpenetration of sounds, their 
blend and flow into one another rather than their isolation 
and juxtaposition. It is this latter experience of music 
a~ a continuous temporal flow that leads Bergson to use 
music as an analogical model of the universal duree. 40 
According to Bergson, continuity is evident when 
39 Cf. Chapter II, p. 50. 
40Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 100, 106, 111, 
125; Duration and Simultaneitt, p. 44; Creative Mind, pp. 
127, 147. Langer describes t e temporal flow of music in 
aptly Bergsonian language: "motion is the essence of mu-
sic . . . The realm in which tonal entities move is a realm 
of pure duration." (Feeling and Form, pp. 107, 109-10.) 
It is curious, therefore, that Langer errs by suggesting 
that Bergson never saw "that his 'concrete duration,' 'lived 
time,' is the prototype of 'musical time,' namely passa~e 
. in its characteristic forms." (Feeling and Form, p. 11 ) 
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music is heard, 
When we listen to a melody we have the purest impres-
sion of succession we could possibly have~an impres-
sion as far removed as possible from simultaneity~and 
yet it is the very continuity of the melody and the 
impossibility of breaking it up which make that impres-
sion upon us. If we cut it up into distinct notes, 
into so many "befores" and "afters," we are bringing 
spatial images into it and impregnating the succession 
with simultaneity.41 
A piece of music is an organic sonorous whole. Its con-
tinuity resides, not in the fact that it is impossible to 
distinguish individual notes or that it is impossible to 
meet~with brief pauses, but rather that every note or chord, 
I 
every interval of soundlessness, contributes to the melodic 
progression and unity of the whole piece. The sounds and 
silences work together, creating a single rhythmic flow. 
Susanne Langer explains it precisely, 
When a progression reaches a point of rest within a 
piece, the music does not therefore stand still, but 
.moves on. It moves over static harmonies and persis-
tent tones such as pedal points, and silences. Its 
forward drive may even carry it rhythmically beyond 
the last sound, as in some of Beethoven's works, e.g. 
~n the.finale4of opus 9, no. 1, where the last measure is a silence. Z 
Thus, while the written musical text represents the flow 
of time with discrete motionless symbols, the music itself 
restores the lost continuity by creating an auditory semblance 
41Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 149. Cf. Time and Free 
Will, pp. 100, 125; Duration and Simultaneity, p. 44; 
Creative Mind, pp. 127, 147-48. 
42 Langer, Feeling and Form, pp. 108-09. Cf. p. 113. 
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of pure duration. 43 
The second characteristic that makes music analogous 
to Bergson's duree is its heterogeneity. The character of 
a given piece of music is determined by its tonal variation, 
its changing rhythm, its range of pitch and intensity. 44 
When sound is completely homogeneous, it is heard as a humm 
or a buzz, anq not as music at all. Accordingly, such 
colorations witpin the musical progression, together with 
I 
the continuity which characterizes their deployment in time, 
constitute the two formal properties of music which make it 
. ,, 
an appropriate model of the universal duree. 
The question of how music conveys a meaning is im-
mensely more difficult to answer. At this point one must 
take leave of the Bergsonian texts, for although Bergson's 
comments on musical form invite a consideration of music's 
expressive power, his philosophy neither raises nor addres-
ses questions of meaning. 45 My principal source on the sub-
ject will be Susanne Langer who not only presents one of the 
43Bergson also observes that the unity of music, 
like that of duration, is intrinsic to the process itself 
and not dependent upon an auxiliary unifying principle. 
(Creative Mind, pp. 127, 147) 
44Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 44. 
45For this reason, one finds commentators on Berg-
son such as Ian Alexander and Susanne Langer admitting that 
Bergson has no fully developed aesthetics. Ian W. Alex-
ander, Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection (New York: 
Hillary House, 1957), p. 85; Langer, Feeling ahd Form, 
pp. 114-15. 
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most solid and thorough analyses of music in contemporary 
aesthetics, but who explicitly treats Bergson's position 
and draws out its implications. Since there are important 
differences in the way meaning is expressed in "program 
music" and in "absolute music," the following discussion 
will treat each of these forms separately. 
Program Music 
The ability of music to convey a meaning is clearly 
evident in at least one broad category of compositions 
called "program music." Such music is programmatic in so 
far as it is inspired by and suggestive of an extra-musical 
idea for which the music then provides an auditory semblance. 
As Langer explains, program music "deliberately imitates the 
clatter and cries of the market place, hoofbeats, clanging 
hammers, running brooks, nightingales and bells and the in-
evitable cuckoo. 1146 While program music is commonly thought 
to have originated around the fourteenth century, its high-
point is clearly reached in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century. /Examples from this period are numerous: 
Beethoven's Pa$toral Symphony (1809), Berlioz' Symphonie 
Fantastique (1831), Schumann's Carnaval (1834), Rimsky-
Korsakov's The Flight of the Bumble Bee (1872), Debussy's 
La Mer (1903-05), Stravinsky's Firebird (1908) and finally, 
46 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 220. 
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Respighi's The Fountains of Rome (1917). 47 Each of these 
various works depicts a specific scene, and several portray 
an entire narrative. How is it possible that musical tones, 
which have no semantic correlate, are yet capable of ex-
pressing a meaning? 
Since a musical note is pure sound, in itself sig-
nifying nothing, it is curious that a combination of notes 
in deliberate patterns is evocative of meaning. As the 
above examples illustrate, music can express peasants merry-
making or the moods of the sea, a firebird or a bumble bee. 
In such cases, the composer recreates objects and events in 
sound simply by imitating their essential activities. The 
listener is then led by the suggestive power of the rhythm 
and tone of the musical passage to envision what the composer 
portrays. The signification of "program music," then, re-
sides in its auditory simulation of familiar objects; since 
it is essentially imitative, Langer finds it a rather naive, 
h . . d d f . 48 unsop 1st1cate mo e o expression. 
Although "program music" may achieve signification 
by a rather simplistic technique, it confirms music as an 
expressive form, capable of articulating and communicating 
47Beeth~ven's Pastoral is widely considered to be 
the most outstan~ing example of program music. 
48 I Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 220. 
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a meaning. 49 This fact is rich in implications for Berg-
son's "fluid concept." The manner in which Beethoven sug-
gests a storm or Schumann depicts a masked ball is not al-
together different from the workings of metaphor in lan-
guage. 50 According to the Interaction View, when one states 
"Man is a wolf," he suggests a comparison which draws upon 
all possible associations of "man" and "wolf," and invites 
their interplay. A composer similarly implies a comparison 
between certain sounds and the familiar objects they sug-
gest. The effect upon the attentive listener is that the 
music (like the metaphoric word) activates his "store of 
commonplace associations" which, by their convergence, 
vividly recreate the thunderous storm or the lavish ball 
which the composer is trying to portray. The effectiveness 
of this sound-imagery, just like the effectiveness of the 
word-imagery, depends upon the breadth and vividness of 
one's associations, as well as upon the ability of the 
listener to allow their imaginative play. The meaning 
that program music expresses, then, is fluid, since it is 
freely evoked and irreducible to a specific literal sense. 
How concrete a meaning music conveys, on the one hand, 
depends upon the genius of the composer to create sounds 
49Th. 1 . h . II h 1 is exp ains t e common expression, t e anguage 
of music." 
50Beethoven, Pastoral Symphony, IV The Storm -
Allegro; Schumann, Garnaval. 
-which fire the human imagination; on the other hand, it 
depends upon the receptiveness and responsiveness of the 
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listener which, in turn, is limited by the "store of asso-
ciations" from which he draws. Despite these subjective 
considerations, music is capable of expressing meanings 
which are fluid and concrete, thereby meeting the principal 
requirements of Bergson's "fluid concept." 
Absolute Music 
When one turns to the other end of the spectrum, 
"absolute music,"·signification is more difficult to ex-
plain. "Absolute music" is thoroughly non-programmatic; 
it is pure sound with no extramusical implications. Accord-
ingly, meaning cannot be explained by the tendency of musi-
cal sound to imitate an object, but instead must be grounded 
in the music itself. The strength of Langer's theory of 
significance in music is precisely this: she is mindful 
of the distinction between programmatic and absolute music, 
and finds that the problem of signification occurs most 
authentically in the latter. Furthermore, she shifts at-
tention away from the subjective factors mentioned above, 
and sets aside the problems of the composer and listener to 
explain meaning in terms of the music itself. 51 Her approach 
51
rn Philosoph¥ in a New Key, Langer effectively re-
futes the psychoanalytic theory which finds significance in 
the self-expression of the composer, and the emotional-
response theory which locates significance in the listener's 
emotional reaction. (pp. 206-218) 
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to the question of signification, therefore, is particularly 
suited to "absolute music." 
According to Langer, all music has a definite logi-
cal form and a peculiar semantic of its own. 52 Its concep-
tual content, Langer claims, is feeling. 53 
If music has any significance, it is semantic, not 
symptomatic. Its "meaning" is evidently not that of 
a stimulus to evoke emotions, nor that of a signal to 
announce them; if it has an emotional content, it 
"has" its conceptual content-symbolically. It is not 
usually derived from affects nor intended for them; 
but, we may say that it is about them. MuSIC is not 
the cau~e o~4the cure of feelings, but their logical expression. 
The expressive power of music cannot be adequately accounted 
for in terms of a stimulus-response theory of emotion-since 
music may, in fact, elicit no emotional response in the 
listener and yet it conveys a meaning. Langer argues that 
music need be neither derived from an affective disposition 
in the composer nor need it effect an emotional reaction in 
the listener. Rather, feeling is the conceptual content of 
music, "a logical picture of sentient life," which provides 
the listener with a conception of feeling, rather than an 
52L . S h h . . . h anger cites c open auer as originating t e 
theory that music is "a kind of Language" having a genuine 
conceptual content. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 219. 
53Bergson also suggests, in two brief passages, 
that music is expressive of feeling. Time and Free Will, 
p. 15; Two Sources, pp. 252-53. 
54Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 218. Cf. 
p. 222. 
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irrrrnediate affective experience. 55 As Langer states, in 
music "the content [of emotion] has been symbolized for us, 
and what it invites is not emotional response, but in-
sight.1156 
How does music express this feeling if the nota-
tions which compose it cannot be literally defined and are 
not inherently meaningful? Langer finds that the ability 
of music to symbolize emotion resides in the fact "that 
musical structures logically resemble certain dynamic pat-
terns of human experience. 1157 Musical form, she suggests, 
is the embodiment of feeling, since 
there are certain aspects of the so-called "inner 
life"-physical or mental-which have formal proper-
ties similar to those of music-patterns of motion 
and rest, of tension and release, of agreement and 
disagreement, preparation, fulfillment, excitation, 
sudden change, etc.58 
The expressive power of music lies in the fact that its 
formal properties are analogous to those of our subjective 
experience. The conceptual content of music resides pre-
cisely in the tonal patterns and rhythms of which it is 
composed. Our difficulty in recognizing significance in 
music is due largely to the fact that we are conditioned 
55Philosophy in a New Key, p. 222. 
56Ibid., p. 223. 
57Ibid., p. 226. 
58Ibid., p. 228. 
--------------------------------
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to expect meanings to be namable and definable as they are 
in discursive language. 59 Music, on the contrary, has no 
literal meaning; it is what Langer calls an "unconsummated 
symbol." 
Music bolic form, 
is an unconsummate sym o . rticu ation is its i e, 
but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression. 
The actual function of meaning, which calls for per-
manent contents, is not fulfilled; for the assignment 
of one rather than another possible meaning to each 
form is never explicitly made.60 
Absolute music has an unconventional significative power. 
It is incapable of exact, literal translation, yet clearly 
it conveys, by its harmonies and dissonances, by its melodic 
progressions and abrupt changes, the very rhythm of the 
sentient life itself. It gives no precise delineations of 
feeling, but expresses instead its general forms. The musi-
cal semantic is characterized by a certain "ambivalence 
of content," whereby meaning is a vast interplay of evoca-
tive sounds. Langer explains it well: 
Music is revealing, where words are obscuring, because 
it can have not only a content, but a transient play of 
contents. It can articulate feelings without becoming 
wedded to them .... the assignment of meaning is a 
shifting kaleidoscopic Elay, probably below the thres-
hold of discursive thin ing.61 
The parallel between musical signification and the diaphor 
59Ph'l h . . N K 228 
__ i_o_s_o __ p ___ y_i_n_a __e_w __e_.Y..... p . . 
60Ibid., p. 240. 
61Ibid., pp. 243-44. Italics mine. 
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in language is strikingly obvious. Just as the diaphor is 
an interplay of several images whose meanings converge to 
depict a particular object, so too the emotive overtones of 
musical sounds engage in a "kaleidoscopic play," and finally 
blend to express the dominant feeling which pervades the 
musical composition. This "transient play of contents" is 
both the weakness and the strength of musical symbolism. 
It is its weakness in so far as the emotion expressed is 
general and imprecise; it is its strength because this same 
thoroughly non-representational character of absolute music 
enables it to "be 'true' to the life of feeling in a way 
that language cannot. 1162 In summary, then, the semantic 
fluidity Bergson requires of the "new concept" seems to be 
thoroughly attained, since a single denotative meaning is a 
virtual impossibility given the nature of musical notation. 
The question of how concrete a grasp of feeling music offers 
is a bit more difficult to assess. The necessary vagueness 
and generality inherent in musical symbolism seems to argue 
against this possibility, yet anyone who has listened to a 
Beethoven sonata or a Chopin polonaise must acknowledge that 
one's insight into the life of feeling can be concrete and 
vivid indeed. 
In conclusion, then, the criteria of fluidity and 
concreteness which Bergson establishes for the "new concept" 
62Philosophy in a New Key, p. 243. 
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are clearly fulfilled by music. As an expressive form 
whose medium is time itself, music is a thoroughly contin-
uous movement and, as such, is the closest approximation to 
the fluidity of pure duration. On the level of meaning, 
music exhibits fluidity in so far as it freely evokes 
images and feelings, the interaction of which constitute a 
new semantic with no literal equivalent. Music grasps the 
concrete particularity of an object, event or feeling to the 
extent that the listener can be responsive to the music's 
evocative powers, and to the extent that the composer and 
performer can elicit that response. 
Art 
A final consideration in explicating Bergson's 
"fluid concept" is the visual arts of painting and sculpture 
which, at first glance, seem entirely inappropriate as ex-
pressive forms of the new concept. Even Bergson's few 
references to the arts reveal his cognizance of the prob-
lem. 63 First of all, the visual arts are spatial, and 
whether space be two-dimensional as in painting or three-
dimensional as in sculpture, both media inherit the prob-
lems which infect all spatial symbolism. Just as the jux-
taposition of points on a line extended in space cannot 
63Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 15-16; Intro-
duction to Metaphysics, pp. 22, 32-33. 
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express the uninterrupted flow of time, 64 so too painting 
with its collection of static images, and sculpture with its 
organization of motionless forms, seem ill-suited to the 
representation of the intuited duree. As Bergson consis-
tently argues, "the fixed placed side by side with the 
fixed will never constitute anything which has duration. 1165 
In addition to this formal inertia, the visual arts 
are also limited in the point of view they present. When 
looking at a painting, we are afforded only one invariable 
perspective on the artist's subject. Although we may ob-
serve a painting from near or far, high or low, right or 
left, we cannot alter the fundamental view which is already 
established on the canvas. We cannot get a profile of 
Leonardo's "Mona Lisa," nor can we ask the woman in Andrew 
Wyeth's "Christina's World" to turn around. 66 While free-
standing sculpture allows us to utilize three-dimensional 
space~to move around the object and take various perspec-
tives on it~we always remain exrernal to the object at a 
specific point in space, unable to take more than a single 
64see Chapter I, pp. 11-12. 
65Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 16. 
66Wh'l h f . . . . i e t e use o perspective in painting can 
create the illusion of three-dimensional space, the viewer 
cannot move around or behind objects to exploit that three-
dimensionality. 
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view at a time. 67 Even if we were to exhaust the infinite 
number of possible points of view, which is unlikely, we 
would only return to the initial problem: the medium of 
the plastic arts presents only a single, frozen moment of 
its object. Although we can vary our point of view, we 
cannot vary the fixed attitude of the representation it-
self. 68 Painting and sculpture, therefore, being stable 
in form and selective in the perspectives they allow, seem 
incapable of expressing the fluidity and full particularity 
of an enduring world. 
To regard a painting simply as a collection of lines 
and colors placed side by side on a canvas, or to regard 
sculpture as an extension of material shapes in space, is 
to overlook completely their function as symbolic forms. 
Whether the visual arts are objective or non-objective, 
representational or abstract, their lines, colors, textures, 
tones and shapes taken together embody a meaning. What is 
merely a collection of formal properties becomes signifi-
cative when the disparate elements interact to form a uni-
tary expression. This occurs, according to Langer, as the 
artist borrows forms from the real world, organizes them in 
32-33. 
problem 
assumes 
67Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 22, 
68 See Chapter II, pp. 39-41. This is the same 
encountered in intellectual analysis when one 
a point of view external to the object. 
.... 
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the virtual space of the painting or sculpture, and employs 
them to express vital and emotive conceptions. 69 In dis-
tinctly Bergsonian language, she describes the fusion of 
form and meaning which results. 
This characteristic way in which the artist presents 
his formal structure in a single exemplification is, 
I think, what makes it impossible to divorce the log-
ical form from its embodiment or expression. We never 
pass beyond the work of art, the vision, to something 
separately thinkable, the logical form, and from this 
to the meaning it conveys, a feeling that has this 
same form. The dynamic form of feeling is seen in the 
picture, not through it mediately; the feeling itself 
seems to be in the picture. Symbolic form, symbolic 
function, and symbolized import are all telescoped in 
one experience, a perception of beauty and an intuition 
of significance.70 
Langer's insistence on the integrity of the work of art 
dispels the notion of color, line, shape, etc. as elements 
which stand juxtaposed in space. Theirs is no longer an 
external relation of mere proximity, but a tensive inter-
play which evokes a meaning. 71 Just as the metaphoric 
images in a poem are unified by the presiding theme which 
pervades them, 72 so too in the visual arts the formal in-
gredients do not stand indifferently side by side, but 
69 Bergson too finds art an expression of feeling. 
Although the idea is never fully developed, it receives brief 
discussion in Time and Free Will, pp. 16-18. 
70susanne Langer, Problems of Art, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 33-34. Cf. Feeling and 
Form, pp. 51-52. 
71cf. Alexander, Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection, 
p. 92. 
72
see pp. 79-82 . 
r 
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interact to express the thought or feeling they symbolize. 
Examples from both representational and abstract art will 
show that the effect of this form-meaning interaction is not 
only a more fluid, but also more complete grasp of the sub-
ject they symbolize. 
Representational art varies widely, from an extreme 
realism in which the artist is entirely faithful to his ob-
ject, to vaguer, more suggestive portrayals which, while not 
faithful to their objects in every detail, do offer recog-
nizable representations of them. However realistic a paint-
ing or sculpture, Bergson and Langer agree that it does not 
exist simply for the practical purpose of producing a flaw-
less, literal description of a person, place or thing, (al-
h h h . 11 b . 1. h ) 73 t oug t is may we e among its accomp is ments ; 
rather, its function as an artistic form is primarily to 
say something about the object, to convey to our under-
standing the feeling of its vital reality. For example, 
Michelangelo's David, while being of heroic proportions, is 
thoroughly realistic. The anatomical exactness which 
Michelangelo achieves is legendary. As the critic Frederick 
Hartt explains, every detail of arms, legs, torso and face 
are perfectly calculated to the posture and mood of the 
youthful figure. 
The sinews of the neck seem to tense and relax, the 
73Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 136-38; Langer, 
Feeling and Form, p. 51. 
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veins of the neck, hands, and wrists to fill, the nos-
trils to pinch, the belly muscles to contract and to 
shrink and erect, the whole proud being to quiver like 
a war horse that smells the battle.74 
The figure of David, however realistic, is not a lesson in 
human anatomy, but an expressive form in which every vein 
and muscle signifies "all the passionate drama of man's 
inner nature. 1175 The parts of the body, their diverse 
shapes and textures, are not external and in juxtaposition 
to each other, but are tensively interrelated to convey a 
dramatic sense of the life and feeling of bold, impassioned 
youth. The formal elements embody the meaning, and the 
meaning resides in the organic unity of the formal elements. 
The result is not a static image, but a vital symbol of 
restlessness and tension. It does not eradicate movement 
and activity, but distills it. Thus, the single moment of 
the figure which Michelangelo presents is limiting only 
insofar as the viewer fails to perceive the whole range of 
life and feeling condensed within it. Its significative 
power depends not only upon the interplay of content and 
form in the sculpture itself, but also upon the ability of 
the viewer to be responsive to its presentation. Since the 
meaning conveyed by the statue emerges out of the dynamic 
interplay of its formal properties and our associations, it 
74Frederick Hartt, 
(New York: Harry N. 
75Ibid., p. 105. 
Michelan~elo: The Complete Sculp-
Adams, 1 68), pp. 104-105. 
r i 109 
-
is irreducible to any literal translation. Accordingly, 
even an inert, realistic form has vital symbolic powers 
which express, more deeply and more powerfully than any 
discursive formulation can, the fullness and fluidity of 
immediate experience. 
Whether the art form is painting or sculpture, 
whether it is objective or non-objective, the same expres-
sive possibilities exist. In the move away from highly 
representational art to more abstract visual forms, there 
is a liberation from our habitual ways of seeing by distort-
ing familiar objects or even avoiding objective represen-
tation altogether. 76 By displacing our routine perceptions 
with novel, imaginative modes of thought and feeling, such 
modern movements as Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism 
and Fauvism have attempted to enhance the evocative power 
of the visual arts. For example, Van Gogh's Wheat Fields 
and Cypress Trees, while still presenting the familiar ob-
jects the title suggests, does not afford a faithful, literal 
depiction of them. Yet, by the use of fluid lines, comple-
mentary colors and, above all, a coarse rhythmic texture, 
Van Gogh dramatically portrays the movement of clouds and 
cypress and wheat in the summer wind. What Van Gogh achieves 
76Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 135-38. Bergson 
finds that the artist's role is precisely to extend our 
powers of perception by creating new ways of seeing. Berg-
son's earlier suggestion that intuition break with habitual 
modes of perception is well illustrated. See Chapter II, 
p. 59. 
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is not a literal transcription of objects, but the evocation 
of a vital emotional experience of them. In such objective 
but not entirely realistic art, the formal fluidity is ob-
tained by the indulgence in lyrical color and line, and the 
objects are expressed fully and concretely due to the exag-
geration of their most expressive features. 
This principle of gaining expressive power by de-
parting from familiar, literal representations is taken to 
its logical conclusion in totally non-objective, abstract 
art. From the numerous examples provided by the paintings 
of Jean Dubuffet, Jackson Pollock, Piet Mondriaan and the 
sculpture of Constanti Brancusi, Henry Moore, Alexander 
Calder and others, let us examine Pollock's Full Fathom 
Five. The predominant feeling in the painting is that of 
dense and gnarled confusion. The tangle of lines and the 
neutrality of color relieved only by a few smatterings of 
faint orange combine to create the presiding image. With-
out any objective reference whatsoever, Pollock expresses 
an emotional conception with definiteness by creating a 
chaos and tense resistance within the maze of line and color. 
What the painting demonstrates is that abstract art no less 
than representational visual forms is capable of expressing 
a meaning by the interaction of formal elements within a 
virtual space. While its images are divorced from the real 
world, its shapes, colors, textures and lines are rich with 
associations and highly evocative. By drawing from our 
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lived associations, the artist can often evoke a more dra-
matic and vivid conception than can a less imaginative, 
more realistic portrayal. 
What this brief review of representational and 
abstract art has shown is that the artist mobilizes the 
static elements of line, color, shape and texture in order 
to convey a meaning. The movement or play among these 
formal properties themselves, not only gives fluid expres-
sion to the subject presented, but reaches beyond the inert 
and singular perspective portrayed on the canvas or in the 
sculpture to capture the very life of the idea or feeling 
it expresses. As with language and music, our responsive-
ness to the work of art will, in large part, determine how 
concrete and complete a grasp of its subject the visual 
form can allow. What is clear, however, is that the visual 
arts are capable of expressing our innnediate experience, 
without sacrificing either its concrete particularity or 
its mobile duree. Accordingly both painting and sculpture 
qualify as expressive forms of Bergson's "fluid concept." 
Language, music and art, then, each in their respec-
tive ways has accomplished the two objectives which Bergson 
set out for the new concept, namely, that it must be capable 
of "adopting the very movement of the inward life of things," 
and that it "must be cut to the exact measure of the object," 
r 
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. . t f 11 . 1 . 77 grasping i s u particu arity, The relative merits of 
these expressive forms are difficult to assess, principally 
because each has a distinctive semantic which is constituted 
by its own linguistic, auditory or artistic forms. 
In terms of their capacity to express mobility, 
musical and artistic forms seem to occupy the far ends of 
the spectrum, the former being the most purely temporal of 
expressive forms and the latter being essentially inert and 
spatial. These extremes collapse, however, when the formal 
properties of music and art are analyzed in terms of their 
power to express a meaning. Art is no longer a juxtaposition 
.of visual forms in space, but a field for their dynamic in-
terplay. Art becomes a visual mobilization of color, shape 
and line which constitutes a unified thought or feeling. 
Thus art is not as distant from music as it first appears. 
Music similarly begins with static notations which, when 
translated into sound, blend and flow to create a meaning. 
Both achieve a semantic fluidity by means of a fluidity in 
form~although in art the movement is visual, whereas in 
music it is auditory. 
In respect to the question of fluidity, language 
has certain affinities with both art and music. Like art, 
its basic structure is essentially spatial, its words and 
77 Cf. Chapter II, p. 58. 
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sentences are set out side by side in linear fashion. 
Language, however, overcomes the inertness and spatiality 
of its formal properties as the connotations and denotations 
of words blend to form new meanings which, especially in the 
case of metaphor, create a complex and fluid semantic which 
is irreducible to the separate words of which it is com-
posed. As with art, the formal inertia of language is over-
come when its discrete parts mobilize to create a new con-
stellation of meaning. Language, being an auditory as well 
as a visual form, attains a sonorous temporal flow whenever 
it is spoken. Language differs from music in one important 
respect. However fluid prose or poetry becomes, its individ-
ual units retain a distinctness insofar as each is intrinsi-
cally meaningful, whereas the notes in a musical composition 
only take on meaning in relation to one another as the sound 
unfolds. When the discrete meanings of words are broken 
down by a collapse of their form, however, language enjoys 
greater affinity with music, in that its individual units 
cease to be meaningful when taken alone and now derive ex-
pressive power only as their sounds and half-meanings blend 
and flow into one another. 
How well language, music and art can express the 
concrete, particular features of their objects is more 
difficult to determine. When we consider a realistic paint-
ing or sculpture, or an exact linguistic description, both 
seem eminently capable of a detailed and quite specific 
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portrayal of their subject; program music, on the other hand, 
creates an auditory impression which is less literally ex-
plicit and more evocative. But if the preceding analysis 
of these expressive forms is correct, then the most literal 
depictions are not necessarily most capable of grasping 
reality in its full particularity. If reality is a fluid 
process of continuous change, as Bergson suggests, then 
literal descriptions fail precisely because they are too 
confining~because in an effort to pinpoint and specify an 
object or experience they forfeit its continuous mobility 
and vitality. Thus it is that metaphorical uses of language, 
and absolute music and abstract art may be capable of more 
faithful and more exact expressions of the immediately ex-
perienced world. Their expressive power lies in their 
ability to evoke our most vivid associations, to incite the 
imaginative play of our thoughts, feelings and memories. 
Their efficacy resides in their ability to call up these 
deeply personal associations which, in the process of their 
interaction, give a deep, comprehensive and concrete sense 
of the reality they symbolize. 
My examination of the linguistic, musical and 
artistic forms of Bergson's "fluid concept" is now complete. 
My objective was to interpret and specify the nature of the 
new concept in order to accomplish several things: first 
to show that Bergson's notion of the "fluid concept" does 
have a positive content, since language, music and art, each 
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in varying degrees, fulfill its specific requirements; 
second, to show that the intuitive method, which is depend-
ent for its operations upon the "fluid concept," is not 
simply a flash understanding incapable of symbolic repre-
sentation but a viable mode of knowing with a wide range of 
symbolic forms. The linguistic, musical and artistic forms 
of the "fluid /concept" provide logical forms whereby one 
can think intuitively and give overt expressions to these 
conceptualizations. 78 Finally, my aim was to show that, if 
the intuitive method is a viable mode of knowing, one could 
take seriously the disclosures based upon it. One such 
disclosure is the universal duree~the fundamental principle 
of Bergson's metaphysics. If pure duration can be grasped 
intuitively, the question remains as to how, if at all, such 
intuitive claims can be verified. I will consider this in 
the final chapter. 
When Bergson recommends that philosophy adopt the 
intuitive method, some additional questions arise. In the 
context of our preceding discussion of the "fluid concepts" 
upon which intuition relies, and the linguistic and musical 
78Bergson fails to explicitly state whether one thinks 
linguistically, musically and artistically or whether one 
thinks according to unspecified "fluid concepts" which then 
find overt expression in these symbolic forms. The first 
interpretation is the only defensible one, since conception 
requires logical form and, even if this form is fluid, it 
marks one's advance beyond rudimentary perceptions, while 
also allowing for organized mental conceptions independent of 
their extra-mental expressions. 
r 
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and artistic forms in which they find expression, Bergson's 
suggestion seems curious indeed. Does Bergson intend phil-
osophy to become dissipated in poetry and novels, in sym-
phonies and paintings, with no distinct identity of its own? 
Does this imply that philosophy should forsake its scientific 
rigor and precision for more artistic, metaphorical modes of 
thought? The implications of Bergson's epistemology and 
aesthetics for his theory of philosophic activity will be 
the topic of the concluding chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY 
Coextensive with Bergson's development of the 
theory of intuition is his proposal that philosophy, and 
in particular metaphysics, adopt the intuitive method. 
This recommendation is thoroughly consistent with Bergson's 
metaphysical and epistemological suppositions. According 
to Bergson, metaphysics seeks a pure, disinterested knowl-
edge of reality as it essentially is~a continuous tem-
poral flow. His epistemological distinction between intel-
lectual analysis and intuition is clearly elaborated with 
the metaphysician in mind. Whereas intellectual analysis 
is a method of knowing which stabilizes and orders the 
fluid temporality of existing things in order to provide a 
firm foundation for action, 1 intuition is devoid of prac-
tical interest and designed to facilitate an immediate 
grasp of duration as duration. 2 Thus, the intuitive method 
is, by definition, commensurate with the objectives of 
metaphysics. 
1
see Chapter II, pp. 47-48. 
2Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 39-40. 
For Bergson the alternative is clear: "Either there is no 
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However logically coherent Bergson's recommendation 
is in terms of his other philosophical claims, it seems 
upon closer examination to pose more problems than it 
solves. Numerous questions arise concerning both the meth-
odology and discourse of this new intuitive philosophy. 
First of all, does the theory of intuition, as described by 
Bergson, provide a method at all? Does Bergson establish a 
definite procedure which philosophers can employ to obtain 
knowledge about the world? If so, then how can intuitive 
disclosures be verified? Inseparable from these methodo-
logical considerations are questions pertaining to philo-
sophic discourse. If ordinary discursive language is in-
appropriate to intuition, as Bergson suggests, then is the 
philosopher permitted, or even encouraged, to use non-
discursive forms? Do music and art, which are similarly 
non-discursive, have any legitimate role in the philosophic 
enterprise? Does Bergson's suggestion for a discourse 
appropriate to intuition require that philosophy forsake 
its aim of clarity and precision, adopting artistic modes 
of expression which are more elusive and difficult to test? 
A closer look at these questions hopefully will 
philosophy possible, and all knowledge of things is a prac-
tical knowledge aimed at the profit to be drawn from them, 
or else philosophy consists in placing oneself within the 
object itself by an effort of intuition." Cf. Introduction 
to Metaphysics, pp. 24, 27, 30, 37, 49, 51-52, 60; Mind-
Enerf~· p. 6; Cr~ative Evolution, pp. 34-35; Creative Mind, 
pp. • 30-32, 37, 61, 107-29, 138. 
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serve to integrate the metaphysical and epistemological 
issues previously elaborated in this study, to draw out the 
full implications of Bergson's rather innovative philosophy 
of expression, and finally, to give an overview of Bergson's 
theory of philosophic activity which pervades and unifies 
his other philosophic concerns. 
Intuition as Philosophic Method 
Speaking of Bergson as well as other intuitionist 
philosophers, Susanne Langer states, "intuition is not a 
'method' at all, but an event. 113 Her verdict is puzzling 
to the reader of Bergson who finds, from the fntroduction 
to Metaphysics onward, countless references to intuition 
as a viable philosophic method. Several commentators 
on Bergson, such as Carr, Chevalier and Kahn, have taken 
seriously Bergson's suggestion and have offered substantial 
discussions of his intuitive methodology. 4 My interpre-
tation in this paper has sided with those who discover in 
Bergson's theory of intuition the delineation of a philo-
sophic method; in addition to being swayed by Bergson's 
3 Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 378. 
4H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Change, pp. 1-
19; Jacques Chevalier, "The Method, Intuition and the 
Philosophic Mind," Henri Bergson, trans. by Lilian A. Clare 
(New York: AMS Press, 1969), pp. 74-113; Sholom J. Kahn, 
"Henri Bergson's Method," Antioch Review, V (September, 
1945), 440-51. 
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own explicit statements on the subject, 5 I find that 
Bergson describes intuition, not simply as an "event," but 
as a formal procedure with definite stages, designed to 
accomplish a specific end. 
As discussed at length in Chapter II, intuition is 
a cognitive process consisting of three stages. 6 The first 
is perception in which the mind obtains a non-positional 
view of the object, by seizing it immediately as it is in 
itself. This direct apprehension requires that one per-
ceive the object non-spatially, relinquishing one's external 
point of view in favor of "entering into" the object itself. 
In the second stage, one's original perceptions are raised 
to the level of conception where they obtain the logical 
form of the "fluid concept." At this stage, intuition has 
ceased to be a mere "event" and has taken on symbolic forms 
which make intuitive thinking, or conceiving, possible. 
Finally, the "fluid conceptions" receive overt expression 
in such media as language, music and art. 7 This third 
stage confirms the fact that intuition is neither private 
5see Chapter IV, n. 2. 
6see Chapter II, pp. 52-60. 
7The distinction between "fluid concepts" as forms 
of conception and as forms of expression is discussed in 
Chapter III, pp. 114-15. However, legitimate the epistemo-
logical distinction between conceiving and expressing, one 
should be mindful of Bergson's ambiguity as to the exact 
nature of the distinction. 
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nor incommunicable, but rather is able to adopt expressive 
forms which convey a meaning and which, especially in the 
case of music and art, have almost universal intelligibil-
ity. 8 All three stages are unified by a single aim, to 
attain knowledge of reality as the pure duration that it is. 
Intuition, therefore, meets the fundamental require-
ments of a formal method: it is an established procedure 
with recognizable stages, which occur in a definite logical 
sequence and cooperate toward a single end. Once delineated, 
these successive stages form an integral methodology which, 
at least in principle, is independent of the thematic con-
siderations in the context of which it was framed. 
Evaluation of this method is much more difficult 
than its description. One reason for this is ~hat although 
Bergson's rationale for the intuitive method is clear, es-
pecially in view of his criticisms of intellectual analysis, 
its final test rests upon its implementation. While Bergson 
8Music is among the most universal of expressive 
forms. Even if we must train our ear to appreciate the 
music of foreign cultures, such appreciation is facilitated 
by the fact that musical notation is not tied to any cul-
tural semantic. While artistic symbols are somewhat more 
culture-bound, people most often seem capable of perceiving 
a universal element intrinsic to them which goes beyond the 
particular time and place in which the art was produced. 
The prominence of Oriental or African or primitive art in 
most American museums attests to this trans-cultural value 
of the artistic medium. Language is possibly the least 
universal in that words and their meanings are quite parti-
cular to the peoples who use them. However successful a 
translation may be, it can never deliver adequately the full 
sense of the original text. 
r 
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has specified what needs to be accomplished, he is obscure 
on the crucial question of how. His theory of perception 
is a case in point. Bergson critizes the analytical method 
for adopting a point of view external to its object, there-
by introducing space and preventing the apprehension of pure 
time. One solution to this spatializing tendency is to re-
linquish one's outside point of view in preference to per-
ceiving the object "from where it is, as it is in itself." 
But exactly how one avoids taking a point of view or how one 
enters into the object is never fully explained. Bergson's 
difficulty in setting out this first stage of the intuitive 
method is his inability to adequately account for its imple-
mentation. Similarly, at each stage Bergson defines the 
objectives of intuition, that it should enter into the ob-
ject and that it should conceive and express the object as it 
is. Yet how this is to be accomplished is described only 
negatively. Bergson simply suggests that we avoid external 
points of view and avoid the static and partial concepts of 
analysis in our thought and expression. Thus, Bergson's 
problem is not that he has failed to provide a methodology, 
but that he has failed to delineate its procedures specifi-
cally and clearly enough to facilitate its use. 
Another problem which besets the intuitive method 
is that of verification. If intuition is to be a viable 
method of knowing, Bergson must determine how the truth and 
accuracy of intuitive disclosures can be tested. Bergson's 
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account is twofold: first, he claims that there is a cer-
tain self-evidence to an intuition which is confirmed simply 
by its capacity to be expressed; and second, that the insight 
gained intuitively is verified when the method of intellec-
tual analysis arrives at the same truth. These two sug-
gestions bear further examination. 
Bergson's earliest statement on the topic of verifi-
cation occurs in 1911, in an essay on "Philosophical Intui-
tion." 
Doubtless everything is not equally verified or veri-
fiable in what a philosophy brings us, and it is the 
essence of the philosophical method to demand that at 
many moments, on many points, the mind should take risks. 
But the philosopher runs the risk only because there are 
thin s of which he feels himself unshakeabl certain. 
e wi ma e us certain to t e extent t at e is a e to 
communicate to us the intuition from which he draws his 
strength.9 
Bergson is on shaky ground for several reasons. First of 
all, he claims that the element of risk in philosophic method 
explains "why everything is not equally verified or verif i-
able." Ordinarily, a tentative hypothesis initiates the 
verification process~either the original thesis is confirmed 
or denied as additional evidence is collected. Thus even 
though philosophy may involve risk, this does not obviate 
the need for verification, so much as establish its urgency. 
Secondly, when Bergson states, "there are things 
of which the philosopher feels himself unshakeably certain," 
9Bergson, Cre•tiVe Mind, pp. 123-24. Italics mine. 
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two further problems arise. One is that the grounds for the 
philosopher's initial certainty is unclear. Is his certainty 
established by a vague, pre-reflective insight or is it 
grounded in a deliberate process of reflection? This ques-
tion introduces the problem of the fundamental nature of 
intuitive knowing which Bergson, in his own mind, seems 
never to have entirely resolved.lo Furthermore, when Berg-
son refers to the fact that "the philosopher feels himself 
unshakeably certain," he seems to be suggesting that intui-
tions are self-verifying, that their truth is evident to the 
person who is having the intuition. This, taken alone, is 
untenable. Not only is it impossible to prove or disprove 
the truth of such an intuition (except of course by having 
the intuition oneself), but even if the experience is had, 
there are no firm criteria by which truth and false can be 
discriminated. 
Thirdly, Bergson states that others will be con-
vinced of the philosopher's certainty only to the extent 
that he can communicate his intuition. Since communication 
is clearly necessary to establish the certainty of an intui-
tion in the philosophic community, and since the most able 
vehicle for the expression of an intuitive thought is the 
"fluid concept," a philosopher's credibility finally rests 
upon his skill in manipulating those expressive forms which 
10
see Chapter IV, pp. 128 -29:for a more detailed 
examination of this problem. 
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meet its requirements. Bergson also implies that an unex-
pressed or poorly expressed idea has no claim to certainty. 
The other assumption which his. statement harbors is serious-
ly in error. Bergson fails to acknowledge the crucial dif-
ference between a statement being true and being persuasive. 
Consequently, Bergson is led unawares to the implausible 
conclusion that an argument's persuasiveness is a mark of 
its truth. An example from Bergson's own philosophy readily 
shows how unsound a principle this is. Recognizing how 
compelling the theory of spatialized time has been, Bergson 
strenuously argues against its continued acceptance on the 
basis that it is an utterly false, distortive view of the 
temporal process. If a persuasive idea can thus be false, 
then persuasiveness is entirely inadequate as a measure of 
truth. 
Bergson's second principle of verification at first 
might seem to rest on more solid ground. In this case, an 
intuitive apprehension is confirmed by the findings of in-
tellectual analysis. 
As the diver feels out the wreck on the sea floor that 
the aviator has pointed out from the air, so the in-
tellect immersed in the conceptual environment verifies 
from point to point, by contact, analytically, what has 
been the object of a synthetic and super-intellectual 
vision.11 
Despite the difference between the intuitive and analytic 
11 Bergson, Creative Mind, p. 64. 
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methodologies, which is the very foundation of Bergson's 
epistemology, he is insisting here upon their complementary 
functions. If intuition is employed by the metaphysician, 
for example, his disclosures can be confirmed and elaborated 
by other sciences which proceed more analytically. 12 Inter-
estingly enough, Capek finds that this is precisely what 
happened relative to Bergson's own duration theory. In The 
Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, Capek ob-
serves that Bergson's notion of duration, which is among the 
principal revelations of intuition, is supported in the main 
by the findings of quantum mechanics and relativity theory 
whose scientific methods are clearly more analytical than 
intuitive in nature. 13 This reinforces Bergson's claim in 
the above passage that the insight provided by intuition can 
be substantiated and verified by the data of analysis. 
The second principle of verification is fraught with 
even more serious problems than the first. One immediately 
is led to question whether unsubstantiated intuitions 
have any claim to truth, and whether the intuitive method 
has any independent value if its ideas require the further 
evidence of a non-intuitive methodology. Both of these 
12Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 53-56, 
60; Creative Mind, pp. 37-44, 124-26. Cf. Chevalier, Henri 
Bergson, pp. 110-13. 
13capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary 
Physics, pp. 22, 286-87. 
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concerns, however, are overshadowed by the much more urgent 
and fundamental question of how two methodologies as differ-
ent as intuition and intellectual analysis can ever arrive 
at the same truth. 
Bergson argues that they can for two reasons. First, 
Bergson claims that science, proceeding by the analytic 
method, eventually will delve deeply enough into the material 
universe that matter will "surrender its inner structure," 
and science will reach the absolute reality of matter as it 
is in itself. 14 However different their methods, Bergson 
maintains that science and metaphysics "will conrrnune in 
experience. 1115 This statement is perplexing in the light of 
Bergson's basic epistemological assumption that different 
modes of knowing disclose fundamentally different worlds. 
Bergson has argued much more convincingly in our previous 
chapters, that our ability to see the world is structured 
by the point of view we assume in perception, as well as by 
the concepts through which we give the perceived world a 
logical form. What enables the intuitive mind to apprehend 
duree is precisely the fact that every stage of its method 
achieves a fluid and concrete grasp of its objects; what 
prohibits analysis from ever knowing duration as duration is 
its tendency, from the initial stage of perception onward, 
14Bergson, Creative Mind, pp. 40-44. 
15Ibid., p. 44. 
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to introduce spatial categories and thereby forfeit time. 
How then can metaphysics and science, whose view of the 
world is confined to the scope and purpose of their respec-
tive methods, ever "connnune in experience?" 
The second argument which Bergson offers on behalf 
of the complementarity of intuition and analysis is actually 
a reply to this objection. In: an Tn:troduction: to Metaphysics, 
! Bergson maintains that the connnon basis of an intuitive met,a-
physics and an analytical science is intuition itself. 
Analysis originates in a kind of primal intuition which it 
then formulates according to the perceptual and conceptual 
schemes of its distinctive methodology. As Bergson states, 
"the simple act which started the analysis, and which con-
ceals itself behind the analysis, proceeds from a faculty 
quite different from the analytical. This is, by its very 
definition, intuition. 1116 If this is so, then Bergson must 
! 
admit to a basic confusion regarding the nature of intuition. 
If intuitive insight precedes its conceptualization accord-
ing to the analytical method rather than emerging in the 
process of it, then intuition must be a pre-reflective ap-
prehension of the world which grounds all our reflection. 
What Bergson is suggesting here is that metaphysics and 
science are simply divergent responses to the same primitive 
intuition; their ability to connnune with each other resides 
16 Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 60. 
Italics mine. 
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in the fact that their point of departure is the same. 
In order to maintain this thesis, Bergson has to 
undermine his entire epistemology. One of the most obvious 
problems is his equivocal use of the term intuition. On the 
one hand, it refers to an elusive, pre-reflective insight, 
and on the other hand, it refers to an established method 
which formulates one's intuitive apprehensions on the level 
of reflection. Acceptance of the first meaning, while it 
saves Bergson's verification theory by accounting for the 
connnunicability of metaphysics and science, obviates the 
need for an intuitive method by providing, in advance, the 
same insight one would gain more laboriously by working 
through its formal procedures. This would undermine the 
distinction between analysis and intuition by stripping in-
tuition of its methodological stages which, in turn, would 
entail the collapse of metaphysics or any philosophy which 
relies upon them. In conclusion, then, I would maintain 
that intuition is a method, not only because its definite 
stages are delineated by Bergson, but because it is the 
only interpretation of intuition which is truly viable with-
in the context of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology. 
Abandoning the theory that intuition is a pre-reflective 
apprehension of the world from which analysis begins, Berg-
son is unable to account for the fact that analysis can 
confirm the findings of intuition. Thus, according to 
Bergson's second principle of verification, intuition 
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remains unverifiable. 
Final evaluation of Bergson's proposal that intui-
tion be adopted as philosophic method must be tentative. I 
have argued that Bergson's theory of intuition does provide 
a methodology, and one which is tailored to the needs of the 
metaphysician as Bergson perceives them. Important questions 
remain, however, concerning the practicability of the method 
itself and concerning the adequacy of the verification pro-
cedures by which the truth of intuitive insights can be 
tested. These issues, being finally irresolvable within the 
Bergsonian corpus, bring the present study to an impasse. 
Although the operations and vocabulary of the intuitive 
method have been clarified in the preceding chapters, the 
implementation of the method and the verifiability of its 
claims cannot be firmly established. A philosopher's re-
luctance to employ the intuitive method would be well grounded 
in the fact that Bergson gives no satisfactory treatment to 
these most crucial concerns. Bergson's neglect in this re-
gard casts a long shadow over one of his most original and at 
times most promising suggestions. 
New Directions for Philosophic Discourse 
Despite the problems which beset the intuitive 
method in general, the philosophy of expression which is 
an outgrowth of the intuitive theory has fertile implica-
tions for philosophic discourse. When Bergson recommends 
w 
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that the philosopher employ intuition as a means of com-
prehending the world, it follows that the philosopher must 
express his intuitions in the only forms entirely adequate 
to them, namely, the linguistic, musical and artistic adap-
tations to the "fluid concept." Is the philosopher thereby 
constrained to use metaphorical language, to write a musical 
composition or to paint a picture in order to satisfactorily 
communicate his insight? Can a philosopher experiment with 
non-discursive forms of expression and retain the integrity 
of his discipline, or must philosophy properly so called 
remain within the bounds of the conventional semantic and 
logic of discursive language? 
In this as in so many other contexts, Bergson's 
explicit comments are few. His theory of philosophic dis-
course exists only insofar as it can be drawn, by implica-
tion, from his theory of intuition and his philosophy of 
expression. Whether Bergson unequivocally endorses all 
non-discursive forms of expression as appropriate to philo-
sophic discourse is difficult to say. However intriguing 
the suggestion that a philosopher could express his ideas 
in music or art, perhaps even more effectively than in 
language, the prospect of such a broad understanding of 
philosophic "discourse" presents numerous problems. 
Although people often speak of the philosophic 
import of a piece of music or art, adopting these media as 
the principal vocabulary of philosophy would create problems 
r 
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more serious than those they remedy. Despite their capa-
bilities for expressing the fluidity and particularity of 
existing things more adequately than can discursive forms, 
music and art prove ill-suited to philosophic discourse. 
The reasons are several. First, what would be the differ-
ence between a musician or artist being philosophical and 
a philosopher being musical or artistic? If the difference 
between philosophy and these other forms is imperceptible 
or merely semantic, all three disciplines lose their auton-
omy, the identity of each is not enriched but dissolved. 
Second, the "vocabulary" of music and art is problematic. 
These forms convey a meaning not by literal description 
but by evocation; their mode is presentational, not argu-
mentative. Thus, while ideas can be musically expressed 
with power and definiteness, they cannot be placed in the 
logical mold of premise and conclusion. While the for-
feiture of these conveniences is compensated for by avoiding 
the many problems of discursiveness, it creates the further 
difficulty of devising a new methodology and reestablishing 
new criteria of truth. Third, since music and art resist 
literal translation, communicating their full import would 
be impossible outside the media themselves. To imagine 
philosophers debating musically or artistically is as 
ludicrous as it is impracticable. Closely related is the 
rather obvious problem that music and art are less accessible 
than language to the wider human community. If most people 
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communicate less readily and less well in these non-
linguistic forms, then philosophy fosters an elitism by 
narrowing the range of its practitioners and of its audience. 
These observations are designed to temper, not 
destroy, the rich implications of Bergson's aesthetics. To 
find music and art inappropriate to philosophic discourse 
is not to diminish or deny their effectiveness as expressive 
forms. Bergson's assessment of music and art as vital means 
of conveying the pure temporality and full particularity of 
existing things urges the philosopher to be receptive to 
their distinctive semantic, and to derive its insight as a 
valuable supplement to his own. 
Language, whether spoken or written, has tradition-
ally been the medium for the expression of philosophic 
thought. Its practical advantages over music and art are 
obvious. Language is an expressive form in which numerous 
ideas and subtle variations of thought and feeling can be 
communicated with considerable economy and precision, in a 
form that is accessible to a wide body of language users. 
What is less readily explained, however, is why discursive 
language has tended to dominate the philosophical vocabulary, 
while non-discursive or metaphorical uses have merely been 
tolerated, or even ignored. In the preface to his extensive 
study of metaphor, Max Black states the prejudice well: 
"To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to be-
little him~like praising a logician for his beautiful 
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handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, 
on the principle that whereof one can speak only metaphori-
cally, thereof one ought not to speak at all. 1117 Such prime 
offenders as Plato, Nietzsche and, of course Bergson himself, 
are usually pardoned for their lapses into metaphor only to 
the extent that their thought is bolstered by more sober, 
discursive prose. 
As a theorist and practitioner of philosophy, Berg-
son challenges this long standing prejudice by proposing a 
mixed discourse, a blend of discursive and non-discursive 
forms. Bergson finds that the coexistence of these lin-
guistic forms in a single discourse is purposive. In the 
context of Bergson's philosophy. discursive language has the 
advantage of providing literal descriptions of the world 
which, however logically coherent and amenable to verifi-
cation, fail to grasp objects in their fluidity and concrete-
ness. Non-discursive language, on the other hand, more ade-
quately expresses the universal duree, and yet its meta-
phorical and unconventional forms cannot be analyzed and 
tested in discursive terms. Neither discursive nor non-
discursive language alone can fulfill the philosopher's 
twofold aim: to describe and explain the world as it is, 
and yet to do so in a language that withstands logical 
scrutiny and analysis. 
17 Black, Models and Metaphors , p . 2 5 . 
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Anyone who has read a substantial portion of Berg-
son's work cannot help but sense a pervasive tension between 
his strict adherence to straightforward discursive language 
and his more liberal tendency to rely upon metaphoric ex-
press ions to support and confirm his philosophic insights. 
This passage from Creative Evolution provides a clear ex-
ample: 
But evolution has actually taken place through millions 
of individuals. on divergent lines, each ending at a 
crossing from which new paths radiate, and so on in-
definitely. If our hypothesis is justified ... they 
must keep something in common in spite of the divergence 
of their effects, as school-fellows long separated keep 
the same memories of boyhoocl.18 
Bergson's description of the unity which underlies the di-
vergent lines of evolutionary progress is heightened by its 
metaphorical comparison to the bond of memories, which unify 
old school-fellows whose paths have long since diverged. 
Such interplay in Bergson's writings. between discursive 
and non-discursive forms betrays not so much a conflict of 
interests, as an uneasiness with wholeheartedly adopting 
either conceptual scheme to the exclusion of the other. 
This tendency to integrate rather than separate 
the two forms of language has its negative and positive 
aspects. Just as Bergson has difficulty in accounting for 
18Bergson. Creative Evolution, p. 61. Italics mine. 
Bergson's work is replete with similar examples. Sholom 
Kahn. in his article "Henri Bergson's Method," isolates 
several texts to illustrate the same point. (pp. 442-45) 
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the complementarity of the analytic and intuitive methods, 
so now he has failed to provide a grounding for the fact 
that their different languages can express the same truth. 
If discursive and non-discursive languages are untranslatable 
one into the other as we have consistently shown, then at 
most one can say they are expressing the same idea in dif-
ferent ways. The question remains, however, whether an idea 
expressed discursively or non-discursively is the same idea 
at all. 19 
Despite Bergson's inability to provide an adequate 
foundation for his mixed discourse, his recommendation also 
has a more positive side. It contains an implicit challenge 
to philosophers to broaden their conception of their own 
discourse. In addition to analyzing the syntactic and 
semantic structures of ordinary discursive language, phil-
osophers are urged to become more attentive to the workings 
of metaphor, more adept at explicating the wealth of meaning 
it embodies and more proficient in its use. 
By recolillilending to philosophy that it adopt the 
intuitive method, Bergson's objective is to extend and 
deepen our comprehension of a world that analysis, with 
its discursive forms, disfigures. Despite the problems 
which attend Bergson's theory of intuition, they should 
not obscure his basic insight, that a new conceptual scheme 
19cf. Chapter IV, pp. 128-30. 
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and a new "languagen in which to express it can offer a 
more complete, more accurate and more incisive view of the 
world. Whatever the final verdict on the intuitive method, 
it has given rise to a reevaluation of expressive forms~ 
urging the philosopher to be open to the semantic of the 
artist and musician, while encouraging his own exploration 
of the metaphorical uses of language. Bergson's philosophy 
of expression is the least developed, yet most visionary 
aspect of his thought. Therein he anticipates the concerns 
of contemporary philosophers in his early recognition of the 
urgent need for a revitalization of philosophic discourse. 
r 
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